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Collaborative Enforcement
Andrew Elmore*

Abstract
Labor standards enforcement in the low-wage workplace has long
suffered from a lack of capacity, expertise and remedies that blunt the impact
of public and private enforcers alike. The question of how to address these
pathologies in state and local workplace regulation has gained new urgency
with the virtual explosion of regional labor lawmaking and the deregulatory
impulses of the new federal administration.
This Article identifies collaborationbetween state and local agencies
andprivate, public interest organizations("PIOs") as one pathway to address
these enforcement gaps, by amplifying the deterrenteffect of public andprivate
enforcement and by improving legal remedies. This Article offers this form
of public-private regulatory experimentation, which it calls "collaborative
enforcement," as a conceptualframework thatcan (a) effectively and efficiently
address enforcement gaps by integrating a range of enforcement tools that
public and private enforcers cannot access independently; (b) subject public
agency enforcement priorities to political accountability; and (c) facilitate
sophisticatedtypes of tripartiteregulationchampioned by earlierscholarship.
Private delegations in collaborativeenforcement, however, can create
a risk of PIO abuse of the delegation and of public agency cooptation of PIOs,
which will require measures to protect public agency and PIO independence.
*
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National Labor Relations Act preemption and state nondelegation doctrine
do not threaten the core requirements of collaborative enforcement, but do
constrain the scope of its delegations and legislative aims. The techniques
described in this Article may be applied to other areas of civil enforcement in
which underdeterrenceis a result of similar enforcement pathologies.
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I.

Introduction
Structural changes in the nature of work have made labor and
safety and health violations in the low-wage workplace prevalent and
difficult to detect and resolve. Declining unionization, the increasing
use of temporary and contingent workers, and the "fissuring" of
industries in which lead firms shed labor costs by outsourcing them
to small, often fly-by-night companies, has led to the proliferation of
small, decentralized and geographically dispersed workplaces where
noncompliance with legal protections is an entrenched social norm.'
Public agencies and private, public interest organizations
(PIOs) often share the goal of strengthening labor standards through
enforcement but lack the capacity, expertise or remedies to change
entrenched norms of noncompliance in the informal economy.
Adding to this challenge is the recent proliferation of state and local
lawmaking to lift standards and enact newly-minted protections, such
as mandatory paid sick leave and restrictions on on-call scheduling,
that will only achieve their intended effects if they are effectively
enforced. 2 With the retreat of federal agencies from labor standards
enforcement,3 and the limited role of the private bar in sectors where
1

See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME So
BAD FOR So MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 54, 70-73,

245 (2014).
2

Nearly forty cities and states passed local minimum wage ordinances higher
than the federal minimum wage since 2012. NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT,
CITY

MINIMUM

WAGE

LAWS:

RECENT

TRENDS

AND

ECONOMIC

EVIDENCE (2016), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/City-MinimumWage-Laws-Recent-Trends-Economic-Evidence.pdf. Seven states and twentyeight local jurisdictions have passed legislation requiring paid sick leave,
and many others restrict employers from requiring employees to call in the
day of their shift to determine their daily hours. See Russ Wiles, More States
Adopt Tough Paid Sick-Leave Laws, USA TODAY (July 5, 2017), https://www.
usatoday.com/story/money/business/2017/07/05/more-states-adopt-tough-

&

paid-sick-leave-laws/103336610/; Charlotte Alexander, Anna Haley-Lock

Nantiya Ruan, StabilizingLow-Wage Work, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 41-46

(2015).
3

Over the past year, the federal administration proposed slashing the United
States Department of Labor (USDOL) budget by over 20%, rescinded guidance
providing a broad definition of "joint employers" under wage-and-hour
law, and has declined to advocate for the Obama-era salary basis threshold
expanding overtime coverage for low-wage employees classified as managers.
Bourree Lam, The Jobs Programs Trump's Budget Would Cut, THE ATLANTIC

(Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/03/
trump-budget-dol/519933/; Daniel Wiessner, U.S. Labor Department Rescinds
Obama-EraRule on 'JointEmployment', REUTERS (June 7, 2017) https://www.
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employers are often small and judgment proof,4 this enforcement
burden will rest squarely on state and local public agencies and PIOs
such as unions, worker centers and community-based organizations.
The thesis of this Article is that to address these new
challenges, state and local agencies will need to address longstanding
enforcement gaps that undermine the effectiveness of public
enforcement. It identifies collaboration between state and local public
agencies and PIOs as one pathway to do this, and offers collaborative
enforcement a conceptual framework to (a) effectively and efficiently
address enforcement gaps by integrating enforcement tools and
creating new remedies; (b) strengthen the political accountability of
public agency enforcement; and (c) facilitate sophisticated types of
tripartite regulation championed by earlier scholarship.
While scholars of public-private regulatory experimentation
have traditionally proposed delegating monitoring responsibilities
to the regulated entities,' this Article shows that public-private

4

5

reuters.com/article/us-usa-labor/u-s-labor-department-rescinds-obama-erarule-on-joint-employment-idUSKBN18Y2PZl; Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of Labor,
No. 16-41606, 2017 WL 3149309, at *17 (5th Cir. June 30, 2017).
Employment law noncompliance tends to be concentrated in small workplaces.
Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, StrengtheningLabor Standards Enforcement through
Partnershipswith Workers'Organizations,38 PO L. &So c'y 552,555 (2010) (finding
that the industries "at greatest risk of FLSA violations are overwhelmingly
composed of establishments of fewer than twenty employees"). Employers
in small, low-wage workplaces are often judgment proof and more likely to
respond to notice of enforcement by closing and reopening under a new name,
or by disappearing altogether. Noah Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp
of Employment Law, in THE GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY 47 (2006). Class-action
suits by private attorneys can theoretically afford workers a relatively costless
and anonymous means to challenge unlawful practices. Id. at 46. But they are
unrealistic in small workplaces, and federal wage-and-hour lawsuits typically
cannot be brought by class action. Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Labor's Wage
War, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 383 (2008). Private, aggregate litigation
in employment law, moreover, may soon be closed off entirely in workplaces
that require employees to waive participation in class actions. See Transcript of
Oral Argument, N.L.R.B. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., WL 4882790 (U.S. argued
Oct. 2, 2017) (Oral argument regarding whether required class action waivers
violate the right for employees to engage in "concerted activities" in pursuit
of their "mutual aid or protection" under the National Labor Relations Act.).
The best-known discussion of public-private collaboration in regulation is
enforced self-regulation. See John Braithwaite, Enforcement Self-Regulation:
A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466, 1467-73
(1982). In this model, public agencies delegate monitoring to the regulated
entities, reserving government enforcement resources for monitoring the
regulated entities' internal compliance regimes. Id. This model assumes
the existence of regulated entities with the willingness and expertise to
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regulatory experimentation can also be useful in instances in which
self-regulation by the regulated entities is unlikely in the near
term. In these instances, instead of enforced self-regulation, public
agencies and PIOs can change the behavior of regulated entities
through collaboration, with the goal of amplifying the deterrent
effect of enforcement, as exemplified by collaboration between PIOs
and public agencies in the Fight for Fifteen movement.6
Scholarship that has theorized this possibility7 has not yet
addressed administrative law literature cautioning that privatizing
public regulation can create incentives for abuse, defeat accountability
and undermine democratic values.8 Collaborative enforcement can
design and implement compliance plans. See generally IAN

6

BRAITHWAITE,

RESPONSIVE

DEREGULATION

DEBATE

REGULATION:

19-53 (1992);

AYRES

& JOHN

TRANSCENDING

NEIL GUNNINGHAM

THE

& PETER

N. GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 401-2 (1998) (considering sanctions of private and public enforcers
of environmental law).
See infra Part II(C). Legal scholars have focused on the implications of the
Fight for Fifteen movement on labor law. See Kate Andrias, The New Labor
Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2016), but have not yet explored its implications for
regulation. While beyond the scope of this Article, the benefits and costs of
social movement actor collaboration with public agencies deserves a fuller
examination. Law and social movement scholarship primarily explores the
role of private, public interest attorneys (often in PIs) reacting to political
opportunities to shape the aims of social movements. See Scott Cummings,

Movement Lawyering, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1645,1669-89 (2017) (describing
history of movement lawyering in U.S. from the civil rights era to present).
As Douglas NeJaime argues, this focus on private attorneys can obscure the
role of government attorneys seeking to advance social movement goals and
channeling social movement activities into state-centered tactics. See Douglas
NeJaime, Cause Lawyers Inside the State, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 654
(2012). Examination of the choice by the Fight for Fifteen movement to seek
public agency enforcement to obtain and protect its law reform goals, and
by public agency attorneys to prioritize PIO referrals and law reform goals,
would provide a fuller understanding of the benefits and costs of collaborative
enforcement to the social movements that make such collaboration possible.
7

CYNTHIA

ESTLUND,

REGULATION
PRODUCTION:

TO

REGOVERNING

CO-REGULATION

BRINGING

OF GOVERNMENT AND
ENFORCEMENT

THE
15

TOGETHER

WORKPLACE:
(2010);

THE

FROM

JANICE

UNIQUE

FINE,

SELFCO-

CAPABILITIES

SOCIETY FOR STRONGER LABOR STANDARDS

18-29

(2015),

http://theliftfund.org/wp-content/

uploads/2015/09/LIFTReportCoproductionOctExecSumm-rf_4.pdf
[hereinafter CO-PRODUCTION]; Matthew T. Bodie, The Potentialfor State Labor
Law: The New York Greengrocer Code of Conduct, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.

183, 194 (2003); Fine & Gordon, supra note 4, at 575-76.
8

SeeJODY FREEMAN & MARTHA MINOW, Introduction:Reframingthe outsourcing
Debates, in

GOVERNMENT

BY

CONTRACT:

OUTSOURCING

AND

THE
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indeed create incentives for PIOs to misuse delegations and for public
agencies to coopt PIOs that might otherwise act as public enforcement
watchdogs, requiring political and administrative controls to prevent
abuse that will be discussed in Part IV. But a detailed analysis of
emergent enforcement collaborations between state and local public
agencies and PIOs reveals that restricting delegations to PIOs, and
the limited delegation and deeply intertwined nature of collaborative
enforcement, make abuse less likely than other private delegations.
PIOs have less incentive to abuse a delegation than for-profit firms,
particularly PIOs accountable to communities in which public
agencies channel enforcement, and which have a shared interest
in improving enforcement outcomes in those communities.' The
limited delegation of collaborative enforcement, which maintains a
bright line separating public and private enforcers, affords public
agencies the independence to make value-laden, contestable
policy judgments about enforcement priorities without undue
interference. Its intertwined nature permits public agencies to
exercise meaningful oversight over private delegations to PIOs, and
PIOs to act as an important counterweight to prevent capture by the
regulated entities by holding public agencies politically accountable
for shifts in enforcement priorities that might otherwise be difficult
to detect. Collaborative enforcement can also serve the democratic
value of facilitating tripartite forms of regulation by encouraging
PIOs to channel worker voice into public regulation. These benefits
set collaborative enforcement apart from, and suggest a lower threat
to democratic government as, other forms of private delegation.
While there are many examples of informal, ad hoc
collaboration between PIOs and public agencies, this Article focuses
on two formal, emergent collaborative enforcement techniques. In
the first, which this Article calls remedial enforcement, public agencies
coordinate with PIOs to intensively focus their public and private
enforcement tools on a particular sector in which current remedies
are ineffective or insufficient. In the second collaborative enforcement
approach, which this Article calls grant-based enforcement, state and
local legislatures and agencies fund PIOs to provide capacity and
expertise to assist agencies in sectoral or regional enforcement.
9-13 (2009).
See infra Part IV(A). The greatest risk of abuse in privatizing public litigation
comes from the complete delegation of public enforcement to private, forprofit firms. See Margaret H. Lemos, PrivatizingPublic Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J.
515, 537-56 (2016).
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

9
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Examination of these techniques provides texture to
empirical studies showing that the presence of PIOs in the workplace
can increase "the scope and rigor of regulatory oversight." 0 In lowwage sectors, where firms are often small and undercapitalized,
collaborative enforcement can more effectively and efficiently resolve
legal violations and provide restitution to victims than traditional
investigations or litigation. Intensively focusing enforcement in
previously underregulated sectors can reveal important gaps in
remedies that can be addressed through law reform. Grant-based
enforcement can also improve the durability of collaborative
enforcement by funding the private enforcer's participation. Both
forms of collaboration can foster tripartite bargaining between
employers and PIOs to strengthen and raise labor standards through
lawmaking, unionization, and codes of conduct.
A detailed examination of remedial and grant-based
enforcement also reveals how public and private enforcers configure
their collaborations to account for their different enforcement tools,
motivations, and legal restrictions. The National Labor Relations
Act" ("NLRA"), for instance, may limit union collaboration in public
agency enforcement in ways that pose no obstacle to PIOs outside
NLRA regulation. For PIOs that cannot lobby because of their taxexempt status, political campaigns for stronger labor protections are
out of reach without non-exempt PIOs, such as unions, playing a lead
role.1 2 Non-union PIOs, which are reliant on government funding
because they lack the membership funding base of unions, are a more
natural fit for collaboration funded through public grants. 3 Unions,

11
12

13

Alison D. Morantz, What Unions Do for Regulation, 13 ANN. REV. LAW
Soc. Sci. 515, 523 (2017) (finding that studies of the regulation show more
frequent and intensive inspection of unionized establishments compared with
non-union establishments).
29 U.S.C. SS 151-169 (2012).
26 U.S.C. 5 501(c) (3) (2015) (stating that, while 501(c) (5) organizations may
engage in a wide variety of lobbying activities, other PIOs that have 501(c) (3)
tax status may risk their tax-exempt status if lobbying is a substantial part of
their activities).
See Leslie C. Gates et al., Who Funds Worker Centers?:An Analysis of Publiclyavailable Data and Directionsfor FutureResearch (2008-2014), in No ONE SIZE
&

10

FITS ALL: WORKER ORGANIZATION,

POLICY AND MOVEMENT FOR A

NEW ECONOMIC AGE (LERA Edited Volume) (forthcoming 2018) (finding
that over half of surveyed worker centers nationally receive funding from
government); ELS DE GRAAUW, MAKING IMMIGRANT RIGHTS REAL:
NONPROFITS AND THE POLITICS OF INTEGRATION IN SAN FRANCISCO

53 (2016) (In survey of 100 immigrant-serving PIOs in San Francisco, "sixty-
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which are not restricted in their lobbying and can access funding
from their membership base, but which face shifting membership
demands, are better suited to the short-term and lobbying-focused
collaborations of remedial enforcement.
This Article offers collaborative enforcement as a plausible
pathway to counteract entrenched norms of noncompliance in lowwage sectors of the economy. Remedial and grant-based enforcement
can be deployed as temporary means to create new legal remedies
or elaborate a new labor protection, or in an ongoing, two-tier
enforcement approach to address persistent enforcement gaps.
While the mini-case studies offered here draw from better-known
examples in states with a long history of labor standards enforcement,
they have important implications for other jurisdictions in need of
meaningful remedies and a sustained engagement between public
agencies and PIOs to enforce them. Even in jurisdictions untouched
by local labor lawmaking, formal coordination with PIOs to
identify and assist complainants can enable state and local agencies
to channel enforcement resources to sectors characterized by
widespread noncompliance. The availability of meaningful remedies
and the sustained, coordinated engagement of public agencies and
PIOs that collaborative enforcement can offer may also set the stage
for enforced self-regulation as a next-generation regulatory strategy.
Collaborative enforcement, while an important, emergent
model, also poses challenges to the resulting enforcement design.
The use of public resources to fund private enforcement raises
legitimate concerns about private delegation undermining public
agency and PIO independence.1 4 This may require measures to
prevent PIO misuse of public funds and to ensure that PIO grants
are not simply substituting for capacity and expertise that public
agencies could provide alone. 5 The possibility that grant-based
enforcement will undermine PIO independence in monitoring public
agency enforcement will require strong whistleblower protections as
well. Where these risks cannot be controlled through collaborative
enforcement's administrative design, it may be necessary to identify
alternative means to fund PIO enforcement. While doctrinal

14
15

two reported receipt of government funding, with an average of 55 percent of
their operating budget coming from government funding in 2006.").
See Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring,Evolving SeparationofPowers, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 515, 583-85 (2015).
See Nester M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 617-19
(2017).
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limitations do not threaten the core requirements of collaborative
enforcement,1 6 NLRA preemption and the nondelegation doctrine
limit collaborative enforcement's legislative aims and scope of
delegation.
While the focus of this Article is the civil enforcement
of employment laws in the low-wage workplace, its conceptual
framework has implications for the public and private enforcement
of other laws that call for public and private civil enforcement, such
as consumer protection, fair housing and civil rights, in which private
enforcers cannot effectively vindicate private rights without access to
public enforcement tools. In contrast, it has limited applicability to
enforcement regimes in which there is no private right to vindicate,
such as the enforcement of criminal and immigration laws. In these
areas, private delegations often empower private stakeholders to
make public enforcement decisions, which can create unmanageable
risks of fraud and abuse.' 7 This Article will refer to the wholesale
16
17

See infra Part IV.
Collaborative enforcement has direct applicability to the underenforcement
of consumer protection laws because of mandatory arbitration of consumer
disputes since AT&TMobilityLLCv. Conception, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), which has
displaced the consumer protection class action bar from its traditional role
as private attorneys general. Myriam Gilles and Gary Friedman, After Class:
Aggregate Litigationin the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CH I. L.
REV. 623, 627 (2012). The formal coordination of PIs and public agencies
may, for example, assist in the enforcement of consumer protection statutes
by identifying complainants with pattern-or-practice complaints, just as
public and private enforcers have historically coordinated in the development
of matched-pair testing programs to enforce fair housing and civil rights laws.
SeeJORGES ANDRES SOTO & DEIDRE SWESNIK, THE PROMISE OF THE FAIR

5-7
(2012) (FHA authorizes the HUD to provide grants to PIs, which often use
testing as an enforcement tool, as evidence in civil litigation or in complaints
to federal enforcement agencies.). Delegation of immigration and criminal
enforcement powers, in contrast, has been criticized for failing to account for
ways in which private interests can undermine public enforcement goals. See,
e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the CriminalProsecutionFunction to Private
Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 427-45 (2009) (arguing that privatizing
criminal prosecutions undermines the public goals of public enforcement
and creates conflicts of interest and risks of abuse). The delegation to private
employers, for example, of the responsibility to determine their employees'
authorization to work in the U.S. under immigration law, has been widely
criticized for failing to deter illegal immigration or protect U.S. labor
markets. See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibitingthe Employment of Unauthorized
Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 195 (2007)
(arguing that employer sanctions "has led to increased workplace exploitation
of undocumented immigrants, strengthened the 'jobs magnet' that sanctions
HOUSING ACT AND THE ROLE OF FAIR HOUSING ORGANIZATIONS
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delegation of public enforcement responsibilities, including those
in which there is no private right to vindicate, such as deputization,
to distinguish it from the private enforcer's role in collaborative
enforcement to vindicate private rights.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II will describe the
enforcement gaps that have led to the underdeterrence of labor
standards and explore the ways in which public agencies and PIOs
have addressed these pathologies along a spectrum of public and
private enforcement. Part III will explain and evaluate collaborative
enforcement through examples of remedial and grant-based
enforcement in different jurisdictions and offer them together as a
conceptual framework for enforcing labor standards, particularly in
the informal economy and to elaborate new labor standards. Part IV
will examine the risk of the erosion of public and private enforcer
independence in collaborative enforcement, and the doctrinal
limitations under NLRA preemption and state nondelegation
doctrine. The Article concludes that collaborative enforcement
is a plausible pathway to improve state and local employment
law compliance, increase the political accountability of public
enforcement, and foster tripartite regulation of the workplace.
II. Public and Private Enforcement Pathologies
Workers in the informal economy report routine violations
of basic wage and hour and health and safety laws.'" At the heart
of this failure to protect vulnerable workers lies a frayed system of
public and private enforcement.' 9 Private, for-profit attorneys have
little incentive to represent plaintiffs where labor standards are
aimed to weaken, encouraged illegal immigration, and eroded wages and
working conditions for U.S. workers").
18

See EASTERN RESEARCH GROUP, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF WAGE VIOLATIONS: ESTIMATES FOR CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK

2-3, 26 (2014), https://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/completed-studies/
wageviolationsreportdecember2014.pdf [hereinafter EASTERN RESEARCH
GROUP] (Study commissioned by USDOL estimates that over 10% of lowwage employees in California and nearly 20% of low-wage employees in
New York were paid below the minimum wage in the previous month);
ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS:
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT IN LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA'S CITIES

19

(2009) [hereinafter BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS] (2009
survey of low-wage workers in several states finds that three-quarters of them
were not paid owed overtime and reported not being paid at all for some
portion of their shift.).
GuY DAVIDOV, A PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO LABOUR LAW 224-29 (2016).
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the worst because these employers are often small and judgment
proof.2 0 Public agencies tasked with enforcing labor standards lack
the resources to inspect all workplaces effectively, the expertise to
detect labor and safety and health violations, and the enforcement
tools to remedy them. 2 1 Public enforcers have adopted different
strategic enforcement approaches to prioritize the worst violations
and the least compliant industries. 2 2 Yet, and particularly with the
retreat of federal agency labor standards enforcement, state and local
agencies face strong headwinds in changing employer norms and
ensuring compliance with new statutory protections.
PIOs such as unions, worker centers, and community-based
organizations have historically played a significant role in bridging
these enforcement gaps through private enforcement the informal
economy and by holding public agencies accountable for public
enforcement outcomes. 23 But these PIOs also face limitations in
their capacity, expertise and remedies.
A. The Enforcement Pathologies of Independent Enforcement
Scholarship examining enforcement gaps undermining
enforcement by public agencies and PIOs traditionally treats public
and private enforcement as independent approaches with separate
regulatory pathways. In this binary framework, public agencies are
traditionally the enforcers and PIOs either privately enforce the law or
hold public agencies accountable for public enforcement outcomes. 24
This is, of course, in part because statutes either contemplate or
See generally David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123
YALE LJ. 616, 662 & n.48-49 (2013) ("High-harm misconduct may . .
attract suboptimal private enforcement efforts . . . because regulatory targets
are judgment-proof . . . .").
David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Compliance, and the Problem of
Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 59, 59 (2005);
see also Linda Delp & Kevin Riley, Worker Engagement in the Health and Safety
Regulatory Arena Under ChangingModels of Worker Representation, 40 LAB. STUD.
J. 54, 56-57 (2015).
See generally DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS
THROUGH STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT TO THE WAGE AND
HOUR DIVISION (2010).
See Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalizationof PublicInterest Law, 57 DUKE
LJ. 891, 912-23 (2008) (describing community-based efforts by worker
centers and social services agencies, and traditional legal services provided by
public interest lawyers as two distinct types of PIs enforcing labor standards
on behalf of immigrant workers).
See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 56.
.

20

21

22

23

24
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require independent enforcement. Many statutes, such as the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), the NLRA,
and state unemployment insurance and workers' compensation
anti-fraud provisions, only call for enforcement by public agencies. 25
Others provide for public and private enforcement, such as the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), as alternative forms of
redress. 26 Public agencies, PIOs and legislatures have, accordingly,
traditionally treated particular public or private enforcement gaps
independently rather than as broader, systemic pathologies. This
view can elide ways in which enforcement pathologies reach across
the public-private divide.
This Part will first show the enforcement gaps in public and
private enforcement of employment laws in order to demonstrate
how collaboration can bridge these gaps in the next Part. To visually
demonstrate how enforcement gaps impact independent enforcement,
this Part adapts the familiar enforcement pyramid first introduced
by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite in Responsive Regulation. In an
enforcement pyramid, Ayres and Braithwaite depict an escalating
series of sanctions designed to deter rational actors from violating
the law and to incapacitate bad actors. The purpose of this depiction
is to explain how a public agency's access to an effective enforcement
pyramid can encourage the regulated entities to self-regulate. 27 The
purpose here, however, is different. It is to show gaps in public and
private enforcement pyramids that undermine the effectiveness of
independent enforcement, and suggest their resolution through the
integration of public and private enforcement tools.
1. Public Agency Enforcement
Many state and local public agencies regulating the workplace
begin their enforcement with a workplace inspection or a subpoena
to commence an investigation, while others primarily resolve
workplace complaints through administrative hearings. Where
civil inspections, investigations and adjudications are unsuccessful,
public agencies may commence civil litigation. A number of state
and municipal agencies also have the power to suspend or terminate
business licenses for labor or safety and health-related violations. 28
25
26
27
28

See 29 U.S.C.
See 29 U.S.C.

5 160(c) (2012); 29 U.S.C. 5 653(b) (4) (2012)
5 216 (2012).

supra note 5, at 35-36.
See Andrew Elmore and Muzaffar Chishti, StrategicLeverage: Use ofState andLocal
Laws to Enforce Labor Standards in Immigrant-Dense Occupations, Migration Policy
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE,

VOL. 10, No. 1

NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

85

Together, a simplified public agency workplace enforcement
pyramid is thus:

License
revocation

Civil litigation

Civil investigation/adjudication

Public Agency Enforcement
Public agencies with an enforcement pyramid with access
to several remedies at different levels of severity may develop an
"active escalation" regulatory approach. In this approach, most
enforcement interactions begin at the base of the pyramid. Public
agencies may escalate cases that employers refuse to informally
resolve with intermediate sanctions. 29 By pushing most regulatory
interventions to low and intermediate steps, public agencies reserve
severe, resource-intensive interventions at the top of the pyramid
as a final threat to incapacitate bad actors that will not otherwise
comply with the law.3 0

29
30

Institute 22-30 (2018), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/strategicleverage-use-state-and-local-laws-enforce-labor-standards-immigrant.
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 39.
Id. at 35-36. While public agencies may seek to address an inadequate
sanctions regime by seeking to persuade legislators to provide additional
resources and enforcement tools, they may not engage in grass-roots lobbying
campaigns. See Anti-Lobbying Act, 18 U.S.C. 5 1913 (2012) (prohibiting
federal agencies from substantial participation in grass-roots lobbying
campaigns or spending money on lobbying, but permitting public and private
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However, the effectiveness of the active escalation approach
is contingent on the public agency's ability to detect violations.3 1
First, in most instances this requires access to worker complaints. 32
But workers do not complain, especially in workplaces where
conditions are the worst.3 3 Many employees are unaware that

they are paid unlawfully, possibly because they are misclassified
as independent contractors, or because of language differences,
low literacy levels, or industry norms that-while out of synch
with legal obligations-set low worker expectations of permissible
workplace standards.3 4 Even for workers who understand their legal
rights, few know where to file a complaint with a public agency.35
communications to promote agency positions). State and local public agencies
and officials are subject to different lobbying restrictions. Compare CAL. GOv'T

CODE SS 50023, 53060.6, 86300 (prohibiting state and local officials from

31

providing gifts of value to elected officials but permitting state and local
agencies and officers to engage in public and private communications to
support their agency positions and permitting local agencies and officers to
join associations for lobbying purposes) with WASH. REV. CODE 5 42.17A.635
(prohibiting expenditure of taxpayer funds or facilities to lobby, and limiting
communication to legislature to communications invited by legislators and
requests for legislative action "through the proper official channels").
SeeROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN CAVE & MARTIN LODGE: UNDERSTANDING
REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 272-74 (Oxford Univ.

Press, 2n ed. 2012).
32
33

Fine & Gordon, supra note 4, at 556.
Weil & Pyles, supra note 21, at 90-92; WEIL, supra note 1, at 245-48 (Wage
and hour complaints to USDOL have declined 26% over the past decade, even
as violations have increased during the same period.); Charlotte S. Alexander
& Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 89

IND. L.J. 1069, 1089 (2014) (Almost all employees who do complain about

34

35

rights violations complain directly to their employer, and almost none report
illegal conduct to public agencies.); Rebecca Smith, Immigrant Workers and
Workers' Compensation: The Need for Reform, 55 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 537, 53744 (2012) (Few injured immigrant workers apply for workers' compensation
benefits.); OSHA, ADDING INEQUALITY TO INJURY 6-7 (2015), https://
www.dol.gov/osha/report/20150304-inequality.pdf, (summarizing studies of
injured workers, which "found that fewer than 40 percent of eligible workers
apply for any workers' compensation benefits at all").
WEIL, supra note 1, at 245; Alexander & Prasad, supra note 33, at 1085, 1097
(analyzing the results of BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS, supra
note 18, finding that "about 59% of workers did not know their minimum
wage and overtime rights"); Ruckelshaus, supra note 4, at 380-8 1. Awareness
may be particularly low of subnational protections that do not extend to the
federal level.
Alexander & Prasad, supra note 33, at 1095 (Of surveyed workers, "77% did
not know where to file a workplace complaint with the government."); DE
GRAAUW, supra note 13, at 8-9.
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Public agency efforts to encourage complaints through education is
hindered by the justifiable complainant fear that a complaint will
result in retaliation, particularly in immigrant-dense industries,
where workers may fear that a complaint to a public agency will lead
to arrest and deportation. 36
Second, even with complainants, public agencies often lack
the enforcement capacity to investigate, resolve and monitor cases.3 7
Capacity deficits are acute and unevenly distributed at the state and
local level. Most states have fewer than ten investigators to enforce a
wide range of workplace laws,3 and five states do not engage in any
labor or safety and health regulation at all.39 Local governments, the
site of recent historic increases in regional and sectoral minimum
wages and other labor protections, often have no workforce agency
to enforce them. 40
36

&

37

Alexander & Prasad, supra note 33 at 1091-92 (explaining that nearly half
of workers who reported a complaint to their employer in the previous year
experienced some form of retaliation, and only 15% of "employers addressed
or promised to address the workers' claims"); Jayesh M. Rathod, Beyond the
"Chilling Effect": Immigrant Worker Behavior and the Regulation of Occupational
Safety &Health, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 267, 280-91 (2010) (citing
economic insecurity, language differences, low literacy levels, social and
cultural expectations of permissible workplace conditions, lack of experience,
as well as age and gender as possible factors driving low OSHA complaint
rates in dangerous industries); see also Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the
Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 673-80 (2003).
Despite a rising total number of complaints, staffing at the USDOL and OSHA
has declined since the 1980's in both absolute terms and relative to the rising
numbers of low-wage workers in the U.S. Devah Pager, Bruce Western
David Pedulla, Employment Discrimination and the Changing Landscape of LowWage Labor Markets, 2oo9 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 325-26 (USDOL staffing
decreased between 1975 and 2004, and OSHA staffing and annual federal and
state OSHA inspections declined by half between 1980 and 2006.).

38

ZACH SCHILLER & SARAH DECARLO, INVESTIGATING WAGE THEFT:

A SURVEY OF THE STATES 6 (2010), http://www.fairwarning.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/Link23.pdf.
39

JACOB MEYER & ROBERT GREENLEAF, NAT'L STATE ATTORNEYS GEN.
PROGRAM AT COLUMBIA LAW SCH., ENFORCEMENT OF STATE WAGE

13 (2011) (Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana and Mississippi).
For example, most of the thirteen municipalities in New Jersey that recently
passed mandatory sick pay laws have vested enforcement powers in agencies
with no expertise in workplace enforcement. See, e.g., BLOOMFIELD,
NJ., CODE 5 160-2(1) (2015) (delegating enforcement power to local
department of health) EAST ORANGE, NJ., CODE 5 140-10, 5 (2016) (same);
IRVINGTON, NJ., CODE MC 3513, 5 1(1) (2014) (vesting enforcement
powers in Department of Neighborhood Services).
AND HOUR LAWS: A SURVEY OF STATE REGULATORS

40
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Third, an escalation strategy depends on the availability of
intermediate steps to secure the immediate compliance of reasonable
employers. 4 ' But many agencies possess only a single remedy
and are limited to threatening or using its sole sanction. 42 Public
agencies also often lack meaningful top-pyramid sanctions.4 3 Some
violations of workplace laws carry penalties that are lower than the
cost of compliance.4 4 And even with access to a single, top-pyramid
deterrence option, such as license revocation, agencies cannot
effectively regulate most employers without access to intermediate
steps because "it is politically impossible and morally unacceptable
to use it with any but the most extraordinary offenses." 4s
2. Private Enforcement
PIOs often seek to resolve the same types of workplace
problems as public agencies. Some PIOs, such as worker centers and
community organizations, can informally resolve myriad workplace
cases, often on the spot, with a call to the employer. Those that PIOs
cannot informally resolve may be referred to public agencies for
enforcement that provide case-related assistance, while some PIOs
may engage in civil litigation. 46 Some PIOs may organize a protest
41
42

43
44

&

45

See WEIL, supra note 1, at 237 (finding that complaint-driven inspections take
up more than 70% of USDO's wage-and-hour law investigations).
This describes USDO's Wage and Hour Division, which may only either
negotiate an investigative finding or refer the matter to USDO's Solicitor's
Office to litigate. See Elmore and Chishti, supra note 28, at 17.
USDOL recovery for failure to pay minimum wages and overtime is often
limited to one to two times the owed wages. 29 U.S.C. 5 216(b) (2012).
Despite recent increases in maximum penalties, OSHA often imposes penalty
amounts less than the cost of compliance that are unlikely to deter violations
in industries where complaints are rare. Weil & Pyles, supra note 21, at 62;
29 U.S.C. 5 666(b) (2012). Employment law violations, even if serious and
willful, often only carry a low-level criminal penalty unlikely to garner the
attention of criminal prosecutors. See 29 U.S.C. 5 666(e) (2012) (Willful
OSHA violations is a misdemeanor only if OSHA violation causes the death
of an employee.); 29 U.S.C. 5 216(a) (2012) (Willful FLSA violation is a
misdemeanor, and cannot result in imprisonment until after first offense.).
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 36. This may help explain why,
despite the recent proliferation of "wage theft" laws in municipalities across
the country, they have resulted in few criminal prosecutions. MEYER
GREENLEAF, supra note 39, at 16.

46

JANICE

FINE,

WORKER

CENTERS:

ORGANIZING

COMMUNITIES

AT

72-91, 73, 78-83 (2006) ("The most common
complaint [received by worker centers] by far is unpaid wages, which includes
paying below the minimum wage and nonpayment or underpayment of
overtime.").
THE EDGE OF THE DREAM
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to resolve a specific case, while unions often have the ultimate end
of unionizing the workplace. Unions have also traditionally 4 7-and
increasingly 4 -lobbied state and local government for higher and
more enforceable workplace standards,4 9 a shift from firm-based
bargaining to what Kate Andrias calls "social bargaining-i.e.,
bargaining that occurs in the public arena on a sectoral and regional
basis." 5 0

47

Unions have traditionally influenced politics through contributions and
membership mobilization. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF,
WHAT DO UNIONs
Do? 191-206 (1984); JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT

No LONGER Do 1-2, 31-34 (2014) (describing, for example,
Service Employees International Union's successful lobbying efforts in 1990s
and 2000s for states to create public agencies to assume the role of employer
to bargain collectively with over 100,000 home-based child care workers in
Illinois, California and other states).
UNIONs

48

See generally DAVID ROLF, THE FIGHT FOR $15: THE RIGHT WAGE FOR A

122-64 (2016) (describing union-led lobbying in Fight
for $15 movement and its legislative victories in Washington State, including
$15 minimum wage in Seattle).
Unions are incorporated under a provision of the tax code that has no lobbying
restrictions. 26 U.S.C. 5 501(c) (5) (2015). In contrast, and as with public
agencies and officials, most non-union PIs may not engage in electioneering
because of their exempt tax status. 26 U.S.C. 5 501(c) (3). This restriction
provides ample opportunity for PIs to engage in administrative advocacy
and other forms of lobbying, either by ensuring that their lobbying activities
are not "substantial," or by separately funding lobbying activities through an
alter ego 501(c) (4) social welfare organization. See id.; Regan v. Taxation with
Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 551 (1983) (upholding 501(c)(3) lobbying
restrictions against first amendment challenge on ground that PIs can
exercise free speech through separately incorporated 501(c) (4)).
Andrias, supra note 6, at 8.
WORKING AMERICA

49
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Altogether, the PIO enforcement pyramid is:

F'

Political
campaign

Protest/Union campaign

Civil adjudication referral/civil
litigation
Infornal resolution
PIO Enforcement
As with public enforcement, the private enforcement pyramid
reveals significant enforcement gaps. PIOs are also unable to access
complainants at times. In many low-wage sectors, unions, which
historically have assisted workers in understanding the laws and
how to enforce them, are virtually absent. 5 1 In their wake, non-union
PIOs such as worker centers have increasingly sought firm-level
compliance in the low-wage workplace. 52 But, lacking significant
51

52

WEIL, supra note 1, at 41, 245-46, 254 (Union density was about 7% of total
employment when NLRA passed, rose to about 35% in 1954, and has fallen
once again to 11.3% by 2012, and only 6.6% of the private sector workforce.
Meanwhile, in many sectors in the informal economy, such as commercial
cleaning and restaurants, union density is effectively zero.).
ESTLUND, supra note 7, at 17. These PlOs often have regular contact with the
low-wage, disproportionately foreign-born workers they serve, and as a result
have specialized expertise about the particular labor and safety problems in
the industry or worker community that the PIO serves. FINE, supra note 46,
at 73 ("Most workers first come into contact with a [worker] center because
they are seeking help with an employment-related problem."); JENNIFER
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membership dues or legal fees, these PIOs often depend at least
in part on unstable philanthropic funding sources that are cyclical
and subject to shifting priorities.13 Those PIOs that only informally
resolve or refer cases face the same enforcement problem as singleremedy public agencies.
As with the private bar, civil litigation barriers also undermine
PIOs' access to intermediate and top-pyramid enforcement remedies.
The ability of PIOs to represent workers in private litigation is limited
by its considerable cost,5 4 and the inability of PIOs that receive

federal funding for pro bono legal services to represent clients who
lack authorization to work.55 Even assuming PIO capacity, there is
no private right of action to enforce NLRA or OSHA, 56 and many
back wage claims are too small to justify the hassle and expense
of a FLSA lawsuit.5 7 In contrast to the ease with which a small
employer can evade legal judgments for labor standards violations,
unions seeking to protest the same practices could run afoul of
the NLRAs labor picketing restrictions.58 For these reasons, even
GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS

53
54

67-111, 185-218, 299 (2005) (describing worker center's legal clinic and
organizing work around immigrant worker labor standards complaints, and
legal and policy organizations that assist worker centers).
See Gates et al., supra note 13, at 8-9, 17-18 (finding that worker center
funding is unstable, and that over 20% of funding comes from foundations).
Fee-shifting statutes, which generally require a collectable judgment, is just
as uncertain a funding stream as philanthropy, contingent on becoming a
prevailing party in a suit against an employer with an ability to pay. DEBORAH
L.

55

56

57

58

RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE

115 (2004).

Id. at 116; 45 C.F.R. 5 1626.3 (2014) (ordering that, except in limited
circumstances, Legal Services Corporation "recipients may not provide legal
assistance for or on behalf of an ineligible alien"); see Cummings, supra note
23, at 914 (describing impact of LSC restriction on immigrant workers' rights
infrastructure).
See 29 U.S.C. 5 653(b)(4) (2012) (stating that there is no private right of
action under OSHA); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification ofAmerican LaborLaw,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1551-58 (2002) (arguing in favor of aprivate right
of action to enforce NLRA).
Although the FLSA has an attorney's fee-shifting provision under 5 216, the
private bar may be justifiably wary to take small FLSA cases in jurisdictions
where settlement offers may be conditioned on fee waivers, or judgment
collection is uncertain.
29 U.S.C. 5 158(b) (7) (C) (2012). But see Catherine Fisk &Jessica Rutter, Labor
Protest Under the New First Amendment, 36 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 277,
293-321 (2015) (arguing that an interpretation of the "blackmail picketing"
statute to prohibit peaceful picketing of employers because of substandard
labor conditions violates the First Amendment).
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PIOs with the resources to litigate must triage carefully to conserve
resources, and often lack intermediate steps for cases that do not
merit resource-intensive interventions. PIOs, moreover, lack a toppyramid enforcement tool to incapacitate bad actors that can evade
a legal judgment.
At the center of the remedies gap for public and private
enforcement in the low-wage workplace is the lack of meaningful
remedies for retaliation. The NLRB may only remedy retaliation for
concerted activities such as complaints about labor standards with
the "paltry financial threat" of placing the aggrieved employee in
the ex-ante position, but only after a long administrative hearing,
and without any penalty or other compensatory damages for
chilling speech.5 9 The Supreme Court restricted even that remedy

in Hoffman Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB 60 for the eight million workers in
the U.S. workforce who lack work authorization under immigration
law, most of whom work in low-wage workplaces.6 1 Although
unauthorized workers are employees under the NLRA,6 2 they cannot
receive reinstatement or post-termination backpay as a remedy for
an NLRA violation.6 3 For workplaces with high concentrations of
unauthorized workers, the most likely remedy for an NLRA violation
is a nearly costless cease and desist order and posting.6 4 While
courts generally permit recovery of owed wages notwithstanding
immigration status,6 5 after Hoffman the availability of backpay after
the employer's discovery of unauthorized status for violation of
other anti-retaliation laws remains an open question as well.66
59
60
61

62
63
64
65

66

Estlund, supra note 56, at 1553-54. See 29 U.S.C. 5 160(c) (2012).
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
Jeffrey S. Passel, D'Vera Cohn & Molly Rohal, Share of UnauthorizedImmigrant
Workers in Production, Construction Jobs Falls Since 2007, PEw RESEARCH
CTR.,
(Mar. 26, 2015) http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/03/26/shareof-unauthorized-immigrant-workers-in-production-construction-jobs-fallssince-2007/.
Agri Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 151-52.
Id.
See Lucas v. Jerusalem Caf6, 721 F.3d 927, 930 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding
unauthorized immigrant may recover for employer's failure to pay minimum
wage and overtime pay); Patel v. Quality Inn So., 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir.
1988) ("FLSA's coverage of undocumented aliens goes hand in hand with the
policies behind the IRCA.... If the FLSA did not cover undocumented aliens,
employers would have an incentive to hire them.").
Compare Ambrosi v. 1085 Park Ave. LLC, No. 06-CV-8163(BSJ), 2008 WL
4386751, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008) (relying on Hoffman in declining
to award future lost wages to an unauthorized immigrant in a personal injury
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Gaps in the capacity, expertise and remedies of public
and private enforcers have undermined the effectiveness of their
enforcement tools. The resulting underenforcement of the law has
degraded labor and safety and health standards in many low-wage
workplaces.6 7 To address these enforcement pathologies, PIOs have
lobbied for, legislatures have enacted, and public agencies have
implemented reforms to expand private and public enforcement.
But, as the next section will show, these reform efforts have been
hampered by their exclusive focus on public and private enforcement
as independent regulatory pathways.
B. The Limitations of IndependentlyAddressing PIO and
Public Agency Enforcement Pathologies
Public agencies have addressed enforcement pathologies
by lobbying for increased public enforcement resources, building
internal expertise to investigate the informal economy, and
expanding public and private enforcement remedies. State and
local agencies have developed internal expertise through agency
units to focus on industries where noncompliance rates are high
and to elaborate new statutory requirements, and have conditioned
business licenses on compliance with labor and safety and health
standards.6 8 These measures have improved public enforcement

67

68

suit); Wielgus v. Ryobi Technologies, 875 F. Supp. 2d 854, 862-63 (N.D. Ill.
2007) (holding unauthorized immigrant bringing workers compensation suit
could not recover for lost U.S. wages, but could seek recovery for lost wages in
his home country) with Bollinger Shipyards v. Office of Workers Compensation
Programs, 604 F.3d 864, 877 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding unauthorized workers
eligible for workers compensation benefits under Longshore and Harbor
Workers Compensation Act); Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co., 327 P.3d 797,
809 (Cal. 2014) (finding that immigration law does not preempt state law
that permits post-termination backpay up until employer's knowledge of
employee's unauthorized status).
See Zatz, supra note 4, at 42-47; see EASTERN RESEARCH GROUP, supra note
18, at 48 (Over 110,000 people in New York State and California fell beneath
the poverty level because of minimum wage violations.); Occupational Safety
& Health Admin., supra note 31, at 6 (50% of the cost of workplace injuries
are paid out of pocket by workers and their families.).
See Elmore & Chishti, supra note 28, at 24-28; JULIE A. Su, REPORT ON
THE STATE

OF THE DiviSION

OF LABOR STANDARDS

ENFORCEMENT

1-3 (2013), http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/Publications/DLSEReport2013.
pdf (reporting quintupling of assessment of minimum and overtime wages,
80% increase in penalties, creation of criminal enforcement unit to file felony
charges for egregious labor complaints, and reducing time required for wage
hearings).
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outcomes, but violation rates have remained stubbornly high, which
former USDOL Wage and Hour Administrator David Weil attributes
to a lack of channeling of public enforcement capacity to where it is
most needed.6 9
PIOs have also sought to address enforcement pathologies
by lobbying to expand public and private remedies. One PIO
successfully lobbied in the 1990s for increased civil and criminal
penalties that the New York State Department of Labor (NYDOL)
could impose, 7 0 and in California, PIOs successfully lobbied in 2003
to require employers in the car wash industry to obtain a license
and post a bond to operate in the state.7 1 The effectiveness of
public enforcement reforms, however, is contingent on the public
agency's ability to identify complainants and to resist capture by the
regulated entities. PIOs have addressed this latter shortcoming by
acting as watchdogs for public enforcement, making public agencies
politically accountable for their enforcement outcomes. 72
PIOs have also expanded their lobbying efforts to focus on
expanding private enforcement. For example, in 2004, California
amended its labor code to provide a Private Attorney General
Act,73 and in 2011, PIOs in New York successfully lobbied for the
69

WEIL,

supra note 1, at 222-56 (emphasizing the need for public agencies to
focus on the higher level of industry structures, bad actors who repeatedly and
willfully violate the law, and to encourage complaints).

70

See JENNIFER GORDON,

CARNEGIE

ENDOWMENT

FOR INT'L PEACE,

THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE UNPAID WAGES PROHIBITION ACT: LATINO
IMMIGRANTS CHANGE NEW YORK WAGE LAW 39 n.8 (Sept. 1999), http://

72

&

71

carnegieendowment.org/files/imp-wp4gordon.pdf
[hereinafter GORDON,
UWPA].
Cal. Car Wash Worker Law, CAL. LAB. CODE SS 2050-118 (West 2016).
See GORDON, UWPA, supra note 70; KEVIN BARRY, MARCY KOUKHAB
CHLOE OSMER, REGULATING THE CAR WASH INDUSTRY: AN ANALYSIS
OF CALIFORNIA'S
To

END

WAGE

CAR WASH

WORKER LAW

THEFT, PROTECTING

(Apr. 2009);

NEW YORK'S

CAMPAIGN

WORKERS:

How

THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR CAN IMPROVE WAGE-AND-HOUR

16 (Dec. 2006), http://www.mfy.org/wp-content/uploads/
reports/Protecting-Workers-Dept-of-Labor.pdf
(recommending measures
to improve NYSDOL enforcement); MARCI SEVILLE, REINFORCING THE

ENFORCEMENT

SEAMS: GUARANTEEING
ANTI-SWEATSHOP
SIX

73

YEARS

THE PROMISE OF CALIFORNIA'S LANDMARK

LAW AN EVALUATION
LATER, WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT

OF ASSEMBLY BILL 633
RIGHTS CLINIC (2005),

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article= 1003&
context=werc (evaluating California Department of Labor Standards
Enforcement implementation of law to hold manufacturers liable for violations
of labor standards by garment contractors).
CAL. LAB. CODE SS 2698, et seq. (2004).
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Wage Theft Prevention Act to increase the civil damages for wage
and hour law violations and retaliation that plaintiffs could receive
under state law.7 4 Local government private enforcement reforms

have also channeled private enforcement to small, pro se claims. In
Florida, several counties and one municipality have passed "wage
theft" laws to provide low-wage workers with a pro se forum to
recover small amounts of owed wages,75 and some municipalities
have experimented with government-funded, day-laborer hiring hall
sites to regulate contingent work in residential construction sites.7 6
There is evidence that expanding private capacity and
remedies can improve compliance with labor and safety and health
laws.7 7 But law scholars have criticized privatizing public enforcement
for failing to consider how to guide private enforcement to improve
compliance.78 For Margaret Lemos, this concern is most problematic
when public agencies delegate a public litigation role to private
attorneys.79 David Freeman Engstrom's empirical analysis of private
litigants who enforce public law in qui tam whistleblower cases, for
example, while finding no support for the claim that delegating public
enforcement leads to outright abuse, did find that private attorneys
have used the False Claims Act to exploit regulatory ambiguities
rather than to reveal enforcement gaps. 0 Particularly where private
attorney decisions to file wage and hour lawsuits are motivated in
part by the ability to enforce judgments that generate attorney's
fees, private remedies are most likely to be used against larger,
74
75

76

77

N.Y. LAB. LAw SS 198, 215 (McKinney 2011).
These laws target small claims with a small minimum claim amount
and individual, pro se hearings, and treble damages to encourage private
settlement. Tracey McManus, PinellasCounty CracksDown on Wage Theft, TAMPA
BAY TIMES (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/local/
pinellas-county-cracks-down-on-wage-theft/2253390.
See VALENZUELA ET AL., ON THE CORNER: DAY LABOR IN THE UNITED
STATES
II 6
(2006), http://www.coshnetwork.org/sites/default/files/
Day%20Labor%20study%202006. pdf (identifying "63 day-labor worker
centers created by community organizations, municipal governments, faithbased organizations and other local stakeholders").
Government-funded hiring halls, for example, reduce the frequency of labor
standards violations and workplace injuries experienced by day laborers. Abel
Valenzuela, A Better Day Day-LaborMarket, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2008), http://

www.latimes.com/opinion/la-oew-valenzuelal3-2008augl3-story.html.
78
79

80

Lemos, supra note 9, at 529, 578-82.
Id. For a discussion of this critique of private enforcement of public law, see
David Freeman Engstrom, PrivateEnforcement's Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam
Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1913, 1925-30 (2014).
Engstrom, supra note 79, at 1964, 2000-01.
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solvent employers. As a result, while there has been a substantial
uptick for FLSA suits since 2000,1 it is not clear that these efforts
have substantially improved enforcement outcomes either to fill
gaps in public enforcement or to address the worst offenses. Shifting
private remedies to pro se fora also may not increase complaints
from the informal economy without PIO assistance. It seems equally
plausible that the workers most likely to take advantage of private
enforcement without PIO assistance are those who are most likely
to complain to a government agency.
In short, independent public and PIO enforcement reform
efforts have shown that addressing noncompliance with labor
standards must attend to enforcement gaps as pathologies that extend
across the public-private divide. Public and private enforcement
require complaints to activate their enforcement pyramids,
remedies for complainants and sanctions to deter rational actors
and incapacitate bad actors. Public enforcement alone is unlikely to
improve compliance without the political accountability that PIOs
provide as public enforcement watchdogs, while the effectiveness of
private enforcement is contingent on whether it can be channeled to
sectors in which it is most needed. The next section will explore how
early examples of public-private regulatory experimentation have
sought to amplify the deterrent effect of enforcement, with mixed
results.
C. Tripartism to Deter Rather Than to Encourage SelfRegulation
The previous section has shown how public and private
enforcement pathologies can drive underdeterrence in low-wage
workplaces. This section will show how PIOs and state and local
agencies have increasingly sought to collaborate in order to address
enforcement pathologies that limit the effectiveness of independent
public and private enforcement. It will conclude that, unlike
previous public-private regulatory experimentation that has sought
to shift responsibility for legal compliance to the regulated entities,
emergent public-private collaboration in the low-wage workplace
seeks to improve compliance by amplifying enforcement's deterrent
effect.
81

Lisa Nagele-Piazza, Uptick in FLSA Litigation Expected to Continue in 2016,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 27, 2015), https://www.bna.com/uptick-flsalitigation-n57982064020/ (noting that FLSA filings have increased 450%
from 2000 to 2015).
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Scholars of public regulation in law and related disciplines
often examine public-private enforcement experimentation through
the lens of "tripartism." Tripartism describes regulation that creates
incentives, often in the form of flexible standards and addressing
information asymmetries, to facilitate private bargaining between
regulated entities and PIOs for firm-specific compliance.8 2 Tripartism
can encourage self-regulation by the regulated entities through
public enforcement and monitoring by PIOs. 3 However, selfregulation, even when backed by public and private enforcement, can
have limited potential in low-wage workplaces in which employers
are undercapitalized, competition is fierce and labor is a substantial
proportion of the business cost. In many low-wage sectors, firms have
no personnel department, and owners are often directly responsible
for employment law violations. In these sectors, there is a powerful
norm of noncompliance with basic employment laws.14
Facing entrenched norms of noncompliance and a lack
of employer expertise in compliance and motivation to comply,
public-private regulatory experimentation to shift employment law
compliance to employers through tripartism can have limited impact.
OSHA's Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) is a case in point. Under
VPP, participating employers may opt out of OSHA inspections in
return for their adoption of a safety program, executed by trained
employees with an established protocol to notify managers of and
respond to hazards.1 5 Early evidence suggested that employers that
82
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Guided by New Governance scholarship, tripartism can describe any
regulatory approach that seeks to enlist private participation in regulatory
experimentationthroughimproved governance. See Michael Waterstone, A New
Vision ofPublicEnforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 479-97 (2007); Orly Lobel,
The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 372 (2004). For a description of New
Governance literature, and a critical evaluation of its application to workplace
regulation, see ESTLUND, supra note 7, at 136-39.
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 57-58.
In the car wash sector, for example, a 2008 state investigation found that
nearly 80% of New York City car wash establishments violated wage-and-hour
law, Steven Greenhouse, Carwashes ViolatingWage Laws, State Finds, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 15, 2008), and a California state investigator estimated that over half
of car washes in Southern California failed to pay the minimum wage during
the same period. Sonia Nazario & Doug Smith, Inspectors Find Dirt on Books at
Southern Calif Carwashes, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2008).
Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of
Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1104-06, 1133 (2005) ("Since
2000, these programs have expanded to thousands of worksites, and the
agency has increased the proportion of its resources dedicated to these
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participated in VPP improved their safety and health standards.8 6
But more recently, VPP-participating employers have been found
to have ignored safety and health standards, which government
investigations attribute to OSHA's failure to provide external
accountability.17 The VPP's devolution from a paradigmatic form of
tripartite regulation to a form of deregulation calls into question
the usefulness of tripartism in sectors characterized by widespread
noncompliance. At a minimum, it suggests that tripartism requires
strong, durable roles for public agencies and PIOs to make selfregulation enforceable and accountable."
Law scholars have theorized that tripartism can improve
enforced self-regulation by delegating public enforcement
responsibilities to PIs. 9 But even tripartism backed by delegated
private enforcement can be undermined by the divergent interests
of public agencies and PIOs in enforcement and the possibility of
backlash from the regulated entities.9 0 As Estlund observes, as the
86
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activities to almost 30 percent of its entire budget.").
Id.
Susan Bisom-Rapp, Puzzling Evidence from a Troubled Time: Rethinking State
Promotion of Safe Work During the Bush Administration, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'YJ. 295, 308-10 (2010) (citing U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS: OSHA's
VOLUNTARY
PROTECTION

PROGRAMS:

IMPROVED

OVERSIGHT

AND

CONTROLS

7-10 (2009)). A 2011 internal
OSHA report recommended restructuring the VPP to maintain oversight over
VPP participants, but by 2013 a USDOL Office of Inspector General report
found that VPP controls were still insufficient to ensure that only employers
with adequate safety and health systems participated. Nancy Smith et al.,
Voluntary ProtectionPrograms Review (20n1), https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/
vpp reportnov_2011_rev_7-11-12.pdf; USDOL, Voluntary ProtectionProgram:
Controls are not Sufficient to Ensure Only Worksites with Exemplary Safety and Health
Systems Remain in the Program, 4 (2013), http://www.oig.dol.gov/public/
reports/oa/2014/02-14-201-10-105.pdf.
See Cynthia Estlund, Employment Rights and Workplace Conflict: A Governance
WOULD BETTER ENSURE PROGRAM QUALITY

88

Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK

OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

89

54, 64 (2014) (arguing that voluntary self-regulation
without accountability can "become a thinly disguised form of deregulation");
Fine & Gordon, supra note 4, at 558 (Unchecked self-regulation could
"contribute to the further degeneration of standards in low-wage sectors.");
Leah F. Vosko, John Grundy & Mark P. Thomas, Challenging New Governance:
Evaluating New Approaches to Employment Standards Enforcement in Common Law
Jurisdictions, 26 ECON. & IND. DEMOCRACY 373, 391-93 (2014). Lobel also
warns that voluntary self-regulation is vulnerable to deregulation. See Lobel,
supra note 85, at 1111-14.
ESTLUND, supra note 7, at 23.
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Cynthia Estlund identifies as an example of PIO-monitored tripartism a
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interests of public agencies and PIOs diverge, tripartism backed
by public enforcement faces the risk of PIO and public agency exit
from the collaborative relationship. 9' While enforced self-regulation
backed by public agency and PIO enforcement is a promising
example of tripartism to regulate the informal economy, it suggests
the need to build durable collaborative relationships beyond a single
case outcome given unstable PIO funding sources and the shifting
priorities of PIOs and public agencies.
To address this durability question, political scientist Janice
Fine and law scholar Jennifer Gordon have theorized a form of
tripartism in which PIOs and public agencies extensively collaborate
beyond the outcome of a particular case. 9 2 But formal public-private
collaborations to amplify the deterrent effect of enforcement has
not yet accounted for the potential risks of abuse and cooptation
that collaboration may invite, and doctrinal limitations to the scope
of its delegation and its legislative aims.93 Avoiding the employer

91

92

93

code of conduct developed by the New York Office of Attorney General
("NYAG") to resolve a labor dispute between a union and immigrant
service organization seeking to organize employees of small groceries, or
"greengrocers," and thousands of greengrocer owners in New York City. Id. at
112-16. After a union organizing drive among greengrocery workers, which
identified persistent labor violations, the union and a greengrocer association
approached the NYAG, which negotiated the Greengrocer Code of Conduct.
Id. See also Matthew T. Bodie, The Potential for State Labor Law: The New York
Greengrocer Code of Conduct, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 183, 194 (2003).
The code of conduct required the owners to set workplace conditions at or
above the legal requirements and agree to monitoring by PIOs, in return for
NYAG's using its prosecutorial discretion not to target them for enforcement.
ESTLUND, supra note 7, at 112-113.
In the greengrocer code of conduct example, after the unionization campaign
fizzled, the immigrant service organization and public agency lacked the
resources to sustain firm-level monitoring of code compliance. With the
PIOs' withdrawal from the industry, and without meaningful monitoring, the
employer had little incentive to extend it. ESTLUND, supra note 7, at 114.
Fine & Gordon, supra note 4, at 560. Fine and Gordon point to the New
York State Department of Labor's (NYSDOL) formation in 2009 of the
New York Wage and Hour Watch (W&HW), modeled on neighborhood
watch associations, in which NYSDOL designated specific PIOs, including
unions, the task of educating workers in specific neighborhoods and referring
complaints to NYSDOL. Id. at 5 69-70.
Unfortunately, the W&HW was short-lived. By 2010, NYDOL disbanded the
W&HW to avoid politicizing the nomination of then-NYDOL Commissioner
Patricia Smith as Solicitor of Labor for USDOL. Janice Fine, Solving the Problem
from Hell: Tripartism as a Strategy for Addressing Labour Standards Non-Compliance
in the United States, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 813, 841 (2013). During those
confirmation hearings, W&HW became a major focus, with one employer-
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backlash that has undermined previous public-private regulatory
experimentation will require exploration of these risks and doctrinal
threats, which this Article will address in Part IV.
Recently, forms of public-private regulatory experimentation
have emerged as durable models to amplify the deterrent effect
of enforcement.94 The New York Attorney General (NYAG) has
partnered intensively with PIOs in low-wage sectors,95 and since 2007
San Francisco has required its Office of Labor Standards Enforcement
(SF-OLSE) to fund non-union PIOs with renewable grants to
channel worker complaints to SF-OLSE. 96 These successes with PIO
collaboration have inspired other state and local governments to
experiment with formal collaboration to regulate workplace law.97
To date there has been insufficient attention paid to why
collaboration between PIOs and these agencies have endured where
these other forms of tripartism could not.98 To evaluate this emergent

94

95

96

97

98

backed advocacy group claiming that W&HW "could very likely be a model
used by Smith ... on a national level .... [I]t could turn tens of thousands of
'community organizers' into raving vigilantes nationwide." Id. at 831. While
Smith was eventually confirmed, W&HW was shelved. Id.
Janice Fine has provided detailed case studies of many examples of
collaboration between PIOs and public agencies, ranging from informal crossreferral systems to more sophisticated systems to integrate public and private
enforcement strategies to enforce labor and safety and health standards. FINE,
CO-PRODUCTION, supra note 7, at 18-29.
See generally Jennifer Brand, The Role of State Attorneys General in the
Enforcement of Labor Laws, NATIONAL STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
PROGRAM AT COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL (2007), available in http://www.
stateag.org/policy-areas/labor/labor-resources/20 16/11/22/the-role-ofstate-attorneys-general-in-the-enforcement-of-labor-laws.
FINE, CO-PRODUCTION, supra note 7, at 23-25; see San Francisco, S.F.,
Cal., Ord. No. 140687, Amending S.F. Mun. Code 5 12R.25 (July 17, 2014)
("The Office of Labor Standards Enforcement shall establish a communitybased outreach program to conduct education and outreach to employees.
In partnership with organizations involved in the community-based outreach
program, the Office of Labor Standards shall create outreach materials that are
designed for workers in particular industries.").
Since SF-OLSE began funding PIOs to collaborate, three other cities and
counties, including Seattle, Washington, and Berkeley and Los Angeles,
California, have adopted a similar approach. Seattle, Wash., CODE, S 3.14.934
(2014); L.A. County, Cal., Wage Enforcement Order 5 8.101.090(G) (2016);
Berkeley, Berkeley, Cal., Mun. Code Ch. 13.99, 5 13.99.080 (2016); LosAngeles
Cnty., Cal., Ord. No. 102703 amending County Code, Title 8 - Consumer
Protection, Business and Wage Regulations relating to the enforcement of the
County Minimum Wage Ordinance, 5 8.101.090(G) (Apr. 26, 2016).
Matthew Amengual and Janice Fine propose building internal PIO and
public agency support for collaborations, which they call "co-enforcement,"
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enforcement approach, and its implications for public regulation, a
reevaluation of the benefits, limitations and risks of collaborative
enforcement is in order. The next Part will offer two different
collaborative techniques to bridge enforcement gaps rather than
to shift the responsibility for compliance to the regulated entities.
Examining these forms of emergent public-private regulatory
experimentation will show how collaboration can effectively and
efficiently counteract entrenched norms of noncompliance and
elaborate new standards.
To understand why this is the case, the next Part will first
describe the collaborative enforcement approaches in detail through
mini-case studies. It will visually depict the integration of public and
private enforcement tools in a single, hybrid enforcement pyramid.
It will then evaluate two different techniques for collaborative
enforcement, remedial and grant-based, and offer them together as a
conceptual framework to amplify the deterrent effect of enforcement
by integrating enforcement tools, often with the ultimate aim of
strengthening labor standards through law reform. Part IV will then
examine the normative risks of and doctrinal threats to collaborative
enforcement.
Ill. Public-Private Regulatory Experimentation to Improve the
Deterrent Effect of Enforcement
This Part first introduces the concept of collaborative
enforcement through case studies, showing how public agencies and
PIOs have increasingly collaborated through two different techniques:
(1) remedial enforcement, in PIO-led campaigns to intensively deploy
public and private enforcement tools to change the structure of the
law in regions and sectors where existing remedies are inadequate;
and (2) grant-based enforcement, by funding PIOs to integrate their
private capacity and expertise into public enforcement to channel
enforcement into underregulated workplaces or to elaborate a new

&

by sustaining partnerships between public agency and PIO staff. Matthew
Amengual & Janice Fine, Co-enforcingLabor Standards:The Unique Contributions
of State and Worker Organizationsin Argentina and the United States, 11 REG'N
GOVERNANCE 129, 129-30 (2017). This Article agrees that to expand publicprivate regulatory experimentation, it will be necessary for public agency and
PIO staff to recognize the benefits of collaboration and overcome mutual
mistrust while negotiating conflict. But it will also be necessary to understand
why some collaborations succeed while others fail, and the legal limitations
and incentives for abuse that can constrain or undermine collaborative
techniques.
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standard. It uses the same visual depiction of an enforcement pyramid
from the previous Part, but now public and private enforcement
tools are integrated into a single pyramid to show how collaborative
enforcement can effectively address enforcement gaps identified in
the previous Part.
A. Collaborative Enforcement
1. Remedial Enforcement
In the remedial enforcement approach, PIOs and
public agencies coordinate their use of top-tier private and
public enforcement tools in regional and sectoral initiatives.
The goal of remedial enforcement is often to improve and
create new remedies in a low-wage sector through law reform.

License revocation

PoLIticalcampaign

Protestunion campaign
Private Enforcement

Public Enforcement

In a remedial enforcement approach, PIOs and public agencies
temporarily and intensively focus public and private remedies on a
particular problem or industry. Public agencies and PIOs access toppyramid tools, such as public agency civil investigation, litigation,
and license revocation powers, and PIO public protests, unionization
drives and political campaigns to improve legal remedies through
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law reform. Public agencies and PIOs that engage in remedial
enforcement often expressly affiliate with each other's goals in
joint media statements and jointly support law reform to improve
remedies.
A remedial enforcement approach permits public agencies
and PIOs to access uniquely private and public enforcement tools
to resolve cases and to improve and create new remedies without
formal delegation. In a remedial enforcement model, PIOs and
public agencies engage in only limited coordination of priorities and
referrals, and there is no delegation of case detection, selection or
resolution to PIOs. The fast food and car wash industries are recent
sites of remedial enforcement by PIOs and public agencies.
Fast Food Establishments in New York State
Beginning in 2012, Service Employees International Union
("SEIU") and PIOs in New York began organizing fast food workers
in a "Fast Food Forward" campaign with the aspirational goal of a
$15 an hour wage and a collective bargaining agreement in the fast
food industry.9 9 By November 2012, 200 New York City fast food
workers walked off their jobs, and protests swelled to 200 cities by
2015, the largest protest of low-wage workers in U.S. history. 0 0
In New York beginning in 2012, Fast Food Forward identified
witnesses with similar complaints of violations of wage and hour
law and referred them to NYAG to fuel a state-wide investigation
into violations by wage and hour law by franchise stores of many of
the nation's largest franchisors.101 By 2015 NYAG announced over a
dozen settlements with Domino's Pizza, Papa John's, McDonald's,
and KFC franchisees, amounting to nearly $3 million in restitution
for franchise store employees throughout New York State.1 02
99

Steven Greenhouse & Jana Kasperkevic, Fightfor $15 Swells into Largest Protest
by Low-Wage Workers in US History, GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.
theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/15/fight-for-15-minimum-wageprotests-new-york-los-angeles-atlanta-boston; William Finnegan, Dignity,
NEW YORKER, Sept. 15, 2014, at 74; see also ROLF, supra note 48, at 91-96

(describing formation for Fast Food Forward movement).
100 Greenhouse & Kasperkevic, supra note 99.
101 Paul Harris, New York Attorney General Investigating State's Fast Food Industry,
GUARDIAN (May 16, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
may/1 6/new-york-fast-food-attorney-general-investigation.
102 Press Release, N.Y. Office of the Attorney General, A.G. Schneiderman and
U.S. Dep't of Labor Announce Criminal Charges Against, and Civil Settlement
With, Papa John's Franchisee for Wage Theft (July 15, 2015), https://ag.ny.
gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-and-us-department-labor-announce-
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In one instance, after Fast Food Forward referred labor
complaints about these establishments to NYAG, NYAG received
allegations that a franchisee store manager had fired staff who
complained about performing extra work after clocking out for no
pay. 103 By the following day, NYAG reached an agreement reinstating
the complainants immediately. 104
NYAG's coordination with Fast Food Forward and subsequent
finding of widespread employment law violations in fast food stores
also led the public agency to support the PIOs' demand for higher
state labor standards. The New York Attorney General appeared in
Fast Food Forward rallies, 05 and on April 15, 2015 he called on the
New York Governor to unilaterally raise the state minimum wage
for fast food workers.1 06 The following month New York Governor
Cuomo announced a plan to convene a wage board specifically for the
fast food industry with representation from the fast food employers,
unions, and the state. 107 The wage board recommended a phased-in
$15 minimum wage for fast food workers in New York State, which
the New York Department of Labor issued as an order in September
2015.10 The remedial enforcement effort also resulted in a lawsuit

103

104
105

106

107

108

criminal-charges-against-and-civil; see also Will Bredderman, NY Attorney
GeneralDeclares FastFood Wage Theft a 'Crime Wave,' OBSERVER (Mar. 5, 2015),
http://observer.com/2015/03/ny-attorney-general-declares-fast-food-wagetheft-a-crime-wave.
See Jan Ransom, Fired Washington Hts. Dominos Workers to be Reinstated After
Walkout, Sez Attorney General, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 12, 2013), http://
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/manhattan/ag-delivers-dominos-workersarticle- 1.1546342.
3683 Washington Heights Pizza, LLC. et al., AOD No. 13-491 (N.Y. Att'y
Gen., Labor Bureau Dec. 12, 2013) (assurance of discontinuance).
Ginger Adams Otis, AG Eric Schneiderman Will Join Fight for $15 Rally Alongside
Health Care Workers, DAILY NEWS (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.
com/new-york/ag-schneiderman-join-fight-15-rally-article-1.2185186.
Eric Schneiderman, Gov. Cuomo Can Unilaterally Hike N.Y. Wages: How His
Labor Department Can Use Its Existing Legal Authority to Raise Suffering Workers'
Pay, DAILY NEWS, (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/
schneiderman-cuomo-unilaterally-hike-n-y-wages-article- 1.2186808.
Andrias, supra note 6, at 64-65. New York Labor Law permitted the creation of
wage boards, with representation by employers, employees and the public, to
recommend wage rates for occupations in New York State. N.Y. Lab. L. 5 655.
See Nat'l Rest. Ass'n v. Comm'r Labor, No. 15-001, Resolution of Decision
and Order, at 1-4 (N.Y. Ind. Bd. App. Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.governor.
ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/ atoms/files/WB_5-001_Decision.pdf. The
wage board's powers were suspended after the minimum wage increase. See
Andrias, supra note 6, at n.344.
Patrick McGeehan, New York Plans $15-an-Hour Minimum Wage for Fast Food
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by the New York Attorney General against a franchisor, Domino's
Pizza, for wage-and-hour-law violations by its franchisees in New
York franchise stores.'09 That case is pending.
In response to Fast Food Forward, New York City has also
recently facilitated the self-funding of PIOs in the fast food sector,
passing a law in May 2017 permitting fast food employees to make
voluntary contributions to not-for-profit organizations of their
choice through payroll contributions.110
Car Wash Establishments in California and New York
Remedial enforcement in the car wash sector began in Los
Angeles in 2008, where PIOs formed a coalition called the "CLEAN
Carwash Campaign," which assisted workers in bringing their
complaints of wage theft and health and safety violations to state
and local enforcement agencies."' Through these referrals, over five
years the California Labor Commissioner issued 1,423 citations to
car wash establishments in the state for wage and hour law violations
and registration violations and has assessed $11.6 million in penalties
and $4.2 million in back wages.11 2 The California Attorney General's
office brought a series of civil lawsuits against other operators and in
2012 announced a $1 million settlement with an owner of eight car
wash establishments in Southern California for underpayments.113
This public and private enforcement provided support for
union-PIO lobbying for improved remedies and a unionization
campaign."1 4 To address the persistent problem of judgment
collection,"1 5 the CLEAN campaign successfully lobbied for a
state restitution fund for workers to recover unpaid wages, which

109

110
111
112

113
114
115

Workers, N.Y. TIMES, (July 22,2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/
nyregion/new-york-minimum-wage-fast-food-workers.html.
New York v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., No. 450627/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May
23, 2016) (alleging that the franchisor, Domino's Pizza, jointly employed
franchise store employees and violated state franchise law in failing to correct
or disclose flaws in its payroll system that underreported wages owed by
franchisees to their employees).
N.Y.C. Mun. L. 2017/098 (2017).
FINE, CO-PRODUCTION, supra note 7, at 18-19.
Margot Roosevelt, Union-Backed Car Wash Workers Fight for More Pay, Shade,
ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER (Sept. 1, 2014, 4:04 PM), http://www.
ocregister.com/articles/car-633355-workers-wash.html.
FINE, CO-PRODUCTION, supra note 7, at 25.
Sonia Nazaro, Unions Join to Organize Carwash Workers, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 28,
2008), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-carwash-280308-story.html.
FINE, CO-PRODUCTION, supra note 7, at 25.
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is funded by car wash employer registration and annual fees and
civil penalties for failure to register." 6 The CLEAN campaign also
successfully lobbied to increase the labor bond requirement for the
car wash industry."1 7 Since that time, 25 car wash establishments
have entered into collective bargaining agreements with the union.
In New York City, PIOs used a similar remedial enforcement
approach to improve labor standards in New York car wash
establishments. The PIOs formed a coalition called "Wash New
York" to organize car wash workers to improve labor standards in
the car wash industry."19 It targeted the owners of a large network of
car wash establishments, one of whom had previously been found
to have violated wage-and-hour law by USDOL. By 2014 NYAG
announced an agreement for these employers to pay nearly $4
million in restitution for unpaid wages and penalties for failing to pay
unemployment insurance contributions and workers compensation
premiums. 120 During this investigation, after the owner sold one of
his car wash establishments under investigation, the NYAG obtained
an agreement to transfer the workers to other work sites.121 Since
then, workers in eleven car wash establishments in New York won
union recognition.1 22
The New York City Council, similar to California's
legislature, responded with legislation requiring car wash operators
to be licensed with the city and to obtain a bond to pay for unpaid
wages, with an exemption (or "opt-out") for establishments with a
116

CAL.

LAB. CODE SS 2055 (describing registration), 2065 (describing
restitution fund) (West 2015).
117 CAL. LAB. CODE 5 2055(b) (4) (West 2015).
118 Roosevelt, supra note 112; FINE, CO-PRODUCTION, supra note 7, at 19.
119

WASH NEW YORK, THE DIRTY BUSINESS OF CLEANING NYC'S CARS: CAR
WASH WORKERS FACE Low PAY, OFFENSIVE CONDITIONS, AND POOR

(2012), http://op.bna.com.s3.amazonaws.com/dlrcases.nsf/
r%3FOpen%3Dkpin-8s5ssg.
120 Erica Pearson, Carwash Kingpin John Lage and Associates to Pay $3.9M to Settle
Labor Violations, SaysN.Y Attorney GeneralEricSchneiderman, DAILY NEWS (Mar.
6, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/carwash-kingpin-pay-39m-labor-violations-ag-article- 1.1712206.
121 Julie Turkewitz, Workers Who Protested Sale of Carwash Will Get New Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/nyregion/
after-sale-of-carwash-owners-agree-to-give-workers-new-jobs.html.
122 Stephen Rex Brown, Brooklyn 'Carwasheros'Vote to Join Union to Secure Minimum
Wage Plus Tips, Overtime, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.
nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn-carwash-workers-vote-join-unionarticle-1.2533762.
TREATMENT
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collective bargaining agreement.1 23 This opt-out provision of the law,
however, has been enjoined by a trial court, which found that it is
preempted by the NLRA.1 24
2. Grant-based Enforcement
In a grant-based enforcement approach, legislatures direct
public agencies to provide grants to PIOs to identify and triage
complaints and channel them into public enforcement. While
a grant-based enforcement model requires PIOs to deliver
specific services-typically education, triage and referral-it does
not deputize PIOs as public enforcement officers or delegate
policymaking decisions, such as whether and how to use particular
public enforcement tools.

Cii adjudiction
supportrefenral
Liformina resohuio
PIO Enforcement

Public Enforcement

The most prominent example of grant-based enforcement
is administered by San Francisco's Office of Labor Standards
123 Erin Durkin, NYC Car Washes Must Get Licenses Under Bill Passedby City Council in
Effort to Stem Labor Violations, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 10, 2015), http://www.
nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-car-washes-licenses-bill-article- 1.2253812.
124 Ass'n of Car Wash Owners Inc. v. New York, 15-CV-08157 (AKH), Order
Granting Pl's SJ. Mot. 5-10 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2017).

Andrew Elmore

108

Enforcement (SF-OLSE) .125 The city and county legislature grants a
million dollars annually to fund seven PIOs to provide enforcement
services, overseen by SF-OLSE.1 26 The grant requires the PIOs to
counsel and refer workers with allegations of labor standards
violations to SF-OLSE, the California Department of Labor
Standards Enforcement, or USDOL, or to resolve them directly with
the employer.1 2 7 SF-OLSE also requires PIOs to issue joint media
statements about resolved cases and to provide trainings with SFOLSE investigators in the communities targeted for enforcement.
SF-OLSE investigators may accept documentation about cases from
the PIOs and jointly work on cases with PIOs, and must participate
in quarterly meetings with PIOs.1 28

The legislature delegates to SF-OLSE the selection, training
and monitoring of PIOs,1 29 while SF-OLSE delegates to a single lead

PIO, the Chinese Progressive Association, the task of coordinating
with other selected PIOs to meet grant obligations.1 30 The
legislature in 2012 also created a "Wage Theft Task Force," to make
recommendations and issue reports about how public agencies may
improve their public enforcement, and appointed representatives,
including SF-OLSE and other public agencies responsible for
enforcing labor standards and other PIOs and employer groups. 31
San Francisco's grant process has resulted in a large inflow of
complaints from the underregulated, low-wage workplaces. Nearly
half of the complaints SF-OLSE receives are about restaurants, many
of which come from referrals by the Chinese Progressive Association,
which focuses on the Chinatown restaurant sector.1 3 2 After referral,
125 For a detailed description of the SF-OLSE's partnerships with PIOs, see FINE,
CO-PRODUCTION, supra note 7, at 23-25.
126 See FINE, CO-PRODUCTION, supra note 7, at 23-25.
127 San Francisco Office of Labor Standards Enforcement Wage Theft Prevention
Education & Outreach Services Agreement, A-3(1) (A) (on file with author).
128 See FINE, CO-PRODUCTION, supra note 7, at 24.
129 San Francisco Office of Labor Standards Enforcement Wage Theft Prevention
Education & Outreach Services Agreement, A-3(1) (A) (on file with author).
130 Id. at A-1.
131 S.F., CAL., Ordinance No. 102-12 (2012); S.F., CAL. Admin. Code $5 5.2605.260-5 (2012); see
REPORT

132

SAN

FRANCISCO WAGE THEFT TASK FORCE, FINAL

3-6 (2013).

supra note 131, at 11, 23. The
San Francisco Wage Theft Task Force reports that SF-OLSE resolves nearly
all cases for at least the amount that it determines that the employer has
underpaid employees, often with the assistance of a PIO. Id. at 16, 26 (SFOLSE resolves 99% of its cases where it finds back wages owed, 91% of those
SAN FRANCISCO WAGE THEFT TASK FORCE,
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PIOs also use private remedies to resolve about a third of them with
the employer without any required action by SF-OLSE. 3 3 The San
Francisco grant process expressly directs SF-OLSE investigators to
collaborate in cases with PIOs, which has resulted in large-scale
enforcement. For example, CPA jointly worked on a case with SFOLSE against Yank Sing Restaurant, where workers were initially
too afraid to come forward and where the payroll records falsely
showed no violations. CPA identified workers willing to show the
public agency that the employer's payroll records were fabricated. 134
It brought a private lawsuit, and CPA, SF-OLSE and DLSE jointly
negotiated with the employer for a $4 million settlement and a
"workplace change agreement" with Yank Sing that required the
restaurant to recognize rights not guaranteed by law, including
progressive discipline and paid holidays, monitored by CPA and
Yank Sing employees. 3 s In 2014 SF-OLSE, CPA and the employer
issued a joint press release hailing the agreement.1 36
Seattle adopted a similar model as San Francisco through its
Office of Labor Standards (Seattle-OLS), created in 2014 to enforce
local workplace laws, including the city's minimum wage and
paid sick time requirements. 3 7 In September 2015, Seattle's City
Council provided $1 million for Seattle-OLS to fund a PIO to act
as a hub to train ten other PIOs to provide outreach, education and
technical assistance.' 3 Seattle-OLS also approved a similar grant
for at least the owed amount of back wages.).
133

SAN
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OFFICE
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STANDARDS

ENFORCEMENT,

REPORT FY 2012-2013 (2013),

https://sfgov.org/olse/sites/default/files/FileCenter/Documents/1 1225FINAL%269_MinWageOrdinanceReport 1213.pdf (PlOs independently
resolved eight of the 25 minimum wage cases they referred to SF-OLSE.).
134 See FINE, CO-PRODUCTION, supra note 7, at 27.
135 Press release: Immigrant Workers Negotiate $4 Million Settlement, CHINESE
Ass'N,
(Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.cpasf.org/press/
settlement-yanksing.
136 Id.
137 Elmore & Chishti, supra note 28, at 38-39. Seattle-OLS was initially housed in
Seattle's Office for Civil Rights, which principally enforces anti-discrimination
protections, but now is a stand-alone agency. Id. Like the SF-OLSE, Seattle-OLS
has rulemaking authority and can issue administrative orders for restitution
and penalties. SEATTLE, WASH., ADMIN. CODE SS 14.19.075 (administrative
order authority); 14.20.040(B) (rulemaking authority) (2015).
138 Seattle-OLS distributed these funds to ten PlOs, designating one lead PIO,
the Fair Work Center, to provide technical assistance to nine other PlOs, to
engage in "outreach, hosting community-based education events, developing
training materials to educate workers and other organizations about Seattle's
PROGRESSIVE

110

Andrew Elmore

to employer associations to educate small businesses about how to
comply with the requirements. 39 Seattle additionally established the
Labor Standards Advisory Commission, appointed by the Mayor and
City Counsel and composed of PIOs representing the interests of
businesses and workers. The Labor Standards Advisory Commission
advises Seattle-OLS, the Mayor and City Council about labor
standards, and provides feedback about Seattle-OLS's proposed
rulemaking.1 40

B. Evaluation of Collaborative Enforcement
This Article's account of collaborative enforcement reveals
underdiscussed benefits of enforcement collaboration between
PIOs and public agencies. First, these techniques can effectively and
efficiently address capacity, expertise and remedy gaps, by integrating
private and public enforcement tools within a single enforcement
pyramid, channeling enforcement to particular sectors or regions
of the economy, and by changing the structure of the law when
existing remedies are inadequate. Collaborative enforcement also
permits state and local government to channel private enforcement
to specific low-wage sectors and to elaborate the requirements of
a new labor standard. Third, collaborative enforcement improves
upon the political accountability of public enforcement, which can
insulate public agencies from capture by the regulated entities.
Lastly, collaborative enforcement can facilitate sophisticated forms of
tripartism, including social bargaining between worker and employer
stakeholders in lawmaking and private, firm-specific bargaining to
resolve noncompliance through codes of conduct and unionization.
1. Collaborative Enforcement Can Effectively and
Efficiently Address Enforcement Pathologies
These examples show how PIOs and public agencies can
create a more complete enforcement pyramid by integrating
labor standards, and providing labor rights intake, counseling, and referral
for workers experiencing labor standards violations." 2015-2016 Community
Outreach and Education Fund, OFFICE OF LABOR STANDARDS, https://
www.seattle.gov/laborstandards/outreach/community-fund/2015-2016community-outreach-and-education-fund (last visited Jan. 15, 2017); Elmore
& Chishti, supra note 28, at 38-39.
139 Elmore & Chishti, supra note 28, at 38-39. The most recent budget has
increased the annual grant to $1.8 million for PlOs for worker education,
outreach and referrals and $800,000 for business trainings. Id.
140 Id.
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enforcement tools that PIOs and public agencies could not access
independently. First, collaboration can address enforcement
pathologies by bringing complainants into the enforcement regime.
In the remedial enforcement technique, PIOs' ties to complainants
allowed public agencies to quickly identify targets. Large-scale
detection in these industries then enabled the public agencies to use
top-tier remedies to address problems that they would otherwise
be unable to detect through independent enforcement. As with the
SF-OLSE and Seattle-OLS examples, providing grants to PIOs to
conduct education and outreach can also provide public agencies
with access to complainants to identify enforcement gaps in new
labor standards. The SF-OLSE requirement that PIOs assist workers
in resolving some of the cases they triage before referring them
permits the public agency to establish informal mediation as a
bottom-pyramid enforcement step.
The intermediate public enforcement step of civil
investigations by NYAG of car wash establishments and fast food
franchisees allows PIOs to resolve potentially protracted wage-andhour and retaliation cases. Investigating retaliation as a form of
witness tampering or obstruction of justice enables public agencies
to secure a remedy for retaliation long before the NLRB's hearing
process could even begin, which the employers may have defeated
through delay and attrition.
Third, collaborative enforcement also improves access to
top-pyramid enforcement tools to incapacitate bad actors and to
change the structure of the law where the existing remedies are
inadequate. PIO mass referral of car wash complainants for public
enforcement in California led the public agency to issue penalties in
amounts greater than the cost of compliance. As in the Yank Sing
example, availability of top-pyramid public enforcement remedies
also strengthens PIO monitoring by backing it with a credible
threat of public enforcement if the employer is unwilling to comply.
Where enforcement tools are inadequate, remedial enforcement can
change the structure of the law to create or improve a remedial or
sanctions regime.'1 4 After complaints from PIOs enabled the New
141 In this manner, agencies can use collaborative enforcement to coordinate
with PIOs in lobbying for regulatory changes that make enforcement
more responsive. See
ORGANIZATIONAL
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York Attorney General to conduct a wide-ranging investigation into
the pay practices of fast food franchisees, the NYAG now seeks
law reform through litigation that, if successful, may establish the
franchisor's joint liability for its franchisees' wage-and-hour law
violations in New York State.1 4 2 In the car wash examples, access to
labor bonds enables PIOs and public agencies to efficiently distribute
owed restitution from a surety instead of a potentially insolvent
employer. The car wash licensure requirement of labor standards
compliance also improves public enforcement with a top-pyramid
sanction for egregious violations.
Performing these functions within a single enforcement
pyramid can be more efficient than independent enforcement, by
avoiding duplication in the use of enforcement tools. PIOs often
perform many of the functions otherwise performed by public
agencies, such as witness interviews and triage, and informal PIO
resolution permits public agencies to strategically reserve their
resources. PIO collaboration in case resolution provides public
agencies with access to workers through PIOs in monitoring
compliance, which can be more effective and efficient than on-site
inspections.
Collaborative enforcement also permits public agencies to
channel private enforcement to specific enforcement gaps. As with
SF-OLSE's PIO grants, public agencies in a grant-based enforcement
approach may designate specific regions or sectors where education,
outreach, referral and private enforcement may improve compliance.
SF-OLSE's selection of CPA as a collaborating PIO, for instance,
effectively channels enforcement capacity into San Francisco's
Chinatown restaurants. PIOs may also channel public enforcement
through remedial enforcement. PIO access to workers and use of
private enforcement in the fast food and car wash examples provided
NYAG and the California agencies with a compelling reason to
prioritize those sectors to amplify the deterrent effect of their
enforcement tools.
Lastly, collaborative enforcement attends to the problem of
PIO or public agency exit from the collaborative relationship before
its goals are met because of the unfunded costs of collaboration or

PIOs, in which the FDA publicized need for greater regulation over food and
medicine while PIOs lobbied for more expansive FDA regulatory powers).
142 See Andrew Elmore, The Future of Fast Food Governance, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 73, 79, 87 (2017), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/165-UPa-L-Rev-Online-73.pdf.
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the shifting priorities of PIOs and public agencies.' 43 Premature exit
wastes enforcement resources that would have been better invested
in other forms of regulation that did not require coordination.
The legislative grants of grant-based enforcement reduce the exit
incentive by sustaining costly enforcement functions that PIOs
otherwise lack the resources to perform. Remedial enforcement, in
contrast, controls for exit by requiring a commitment of significant
upfront resources. In the case of the car wash campaigns in Los
Angeles and New York, the CLEAN and WASH campaigns invested
in the collaborative relationship until they achieved the legislative
solution of a bonding and licensing regime that they could monitor.
In the fast food initiative in New York, Fast Food Forward invested in
the collaborative relationship until the referred complaints had been
successfully resolved, and the evidence of widespread noncompliance
with labor standards developed a sufficient factual record for the
NYAG to seek law reform through litigation. Once these goals were
met, the exit costs accordingly dropped for the participating PIOs
and public agencies.
2. Collaborative Enforcement Injects Political
Accountability into Public Enforcement and Prevents
Capture by the Regulated Entities
Collaborative enforcement can also inject political
accountability into public enforcement decisions by making public
agency enforcement priorities transparent to PIOs, and promote
public agency independence by insulating public agencies from
capture by the regulated entities. 4 4 This is in sharp contrast to
independent public enforcement, in which there is no requirement
that public agencies subject their enforcement priorities to public
scrutiny, or even to tell the public what those priorities are.145 Public
agencies often need not disclose communications with private
entities, and anti-lobbying rules exempt enforcement decisions.1 46
The opacity of public enforcement has understandably raised
143 Early examples of collaborations between PIs and public agencies failed to
attend to high exit incentives. See, e.g. ESTLUND, supra note 7, at 114.
144 As Margaret Lemos argues, the challenge of public enforcement is "designing
enforcement institutions in a way that promotes accountability while
preserving a role for independent, professional judgment." Margaret H.
Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and Independencefor the Litigation
State, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 929, 935 (2017).
145 Id. at 933.
146 Id. at 999.
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concerns about the possibility of capture by the regulated entities.' 4 7
In this backdrop of enforcement unaccountability, the
presence of PIOs in the enforcement design can inject political
accountability into public agency enforcement decisions.' 4 Seattle's
Labor Standards Advisory Commission, which provides guidance to
Seattle OLSE about enforcement priorities and produces an annual
report about Seattle OLSE's enforcement outcomes, 4 9 provides a
greater level of public transparency. Seattle's approach of inviting
public participation in public agency enforcement is a traditional role
for local government, which "often operate [s] at the edge of a blurry
line between governmental action and public participation," 5 0 and,
as Nestor Davidson argues, this type of public participation in local
administration "may bolster the ability of local regulators to resist
capture by outside regulated entities." 5 ' The legislative funding of

grant-based enforcement, and its formal grant-making procedures,
also permit interested third party stakeholders-legislators, ethics
groups, and employer associations-to monitor collaborative
enforcement through required PIO and public agency disclosures
about the use of enforcement resources. In remedial enforcement,
elected officials and agency heads publicly state the goals of these
high-profile enforcement initiatives, which subjects them to political
accountability should the initiative fail or succumb to abuse.
PIOs are also more accountable to the public in collaboration
with public agencies than in informal collaboration. In the SFOLSE and Seattle-OLS examples, these public agencies require
PIOs to adhere to a formal grant process, with limited terms, and

147 Id. at 949 & n.85.
148 In the words of Ayres and Braithwaite, "in the presence of empowered [PIOs]
the firm must capture [PIOs] as well as the [public] agency to be effective."
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 71.
149 See Labor Standards Advisory Commission, SEATTLE.GOV, https://www.seattle.
gov/labor-standards-advisory-commission (last visited Oct. 9, 2017); Labor
Standards Advisory Commission Meetings, SEATTLE.GOV, https://www.seattle.

gov/labor-standards-advisory-commission/what-we-do/meetings (last visited
Oct. 9, 2017).
150 Davidson, supra note 15, at 572.
151 Davidson, supra note 15, at 630. David Freeman Engstrom echoes this
argument in his empirical analysis of qui tam suits, finding that public agency
delegation to private litigants pursuing enforcement actions "can improve,
rather than degrade, democratic politics by offering a salutary counterweight
to 'capture' and other patterns of political control within the legislative or
administrative process." Engstrom, supra note 79, at 2003-4.
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performance reviews with measurable outcomes.1 5 2 In jurisdictions
in which multiple PIOs seek to deter employment law violations,
the contested nature of the grant selection process creates a natural
incentive for other PIOs to monitor the collaborating PIOs for
abuse. 53 Abuse by one PIO is also limited by the SF-OLSE and
Seattle-OLS reporting structure, in which one PIO grantee is the
primary contractor accountable for the enforcement activities of the
other PIOs grantees. These controls provide for a greater level of
public accountability than exist in pure public enforcement.
3. Collaborative Enforcement Improves Effectiveness
and Governance of Public-Private Enforcement Through
Tripartism
Finally, these examples show how collaborative enforcement
can facilitate sophisticated forms of tripartism unlikely to devolve
into weak forms of self-regulation. The remedial enforcement
of the CLEAN Carwash campaign and California state agencies
is a paradigmatic example. Developing a public enforcement
initiative around a PIO's enforcement priority, and the subsequent
investigation findings of widespread noncompliance, created an
incentive for the public agency to support the PIOs' legislative
goal of strengthening labor standards in the sector. The license
and bonding requirements now required in the California car wash
sector permit PIOs to continue to coordinate with state agencies in
seeking remedies for employment law violations and to incapacitate
bad actors through license revocation. Grant-based enforcement can
also facilitate durable forms of tripartite lawmaking. Seattle's Labor
Standards Advisory Commission creates opportunities for tripartite
lawmaking through its appointment of worker- and businessaffiliated stakeholders to advise the legislature and Seattle-OLS
152 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and Democracy, in FREEMAN & MINOW,
supra note 8, at 264-67 (arguing that the contract process can improve
accountability by de-politicizing the privatization debate, and focusing the
PIs and public agency on the priorities and trade-offs of outsourcing a
particular function).
153 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supranote 5, at 73 (arguing that PIO abuse is less
likely where the PIO's role in enforcement can be contested by other PIs).
In addition to serving as a check on PIO abuse of grant-based enforcement,
third-party monitoring also permits PIs to evaluate whether selected PIs
effectively represent the interests of the communities that they are charged
with assisting, which the public agency may lack the sophistication to evaluate
without outside PIO assistance.
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about the agency's rulemaking. 5 4

Collaborative enforcement can also facilitate private firm-level
bargaining to improve labor standards. In the car wash examples,
remedial enforcement facilitated unionization as a way to regulate
low-wage workplaces, and protect complainants from retaliation
for complaining about employment law violations.15 5 Unionized

employers in underregulated sectors are also more likely to support
industry compliance with labor and safety and health standards to
put them on equal footing with non-union competitors.1 56 These
workers and employers are therefore more likely to participate in
the kinds of tripartism championed decades ago, in which employers
and workers share the motivation and expertise, and can privately
bargain for their respective roles, in enforced self-regulation.157
Even with more routine, episodic forms of enforcement,
grant-based enforcement can improve the likelihood of tripartite
resolutions by assigning clear and durable roles to state actors and
PIOs. In the Yank Sing example, CPAs protests of labor conditions
in the Yank Sing restaurant opened a pathway for the PIO and public
agencies to negotiate a tripartite agreement with the employer that
permitted a more complete set of prospective, enforceable labor
standards than in a standard resolution of a private wage-and-hourlaw suit. Facilitating tripartism, as illustrated by these examples, can
also channel employers into private bargaining with PIOs for higher
and more uniform industry standards.
Lastly, in addition to improving the effectiveness of
enforcement, collaborative enforcement can serve the value
of enhancing democratic participation by channeling private
participation into public enforcement. SF-OLSE's intervention in
154 Elmore & Chishti, supra note 28, at 38-39.
155 In this light, unionization serves important compliance goals. Workers who
have the assistance of a union are more likely to know about their labor and
safety and health rights, and those with collective bargaining agreements that
require good cause for discipline and terminations are more likely to complain
about labor and safety and health violations. WEIL, supra note 1, at 20-36,
245-48. Firms subject to a collective bargaining agreement have lower rates of
workplace fatalities and serious injuries, and are more likely to comply with
wage-and-hour law. Morantz, supra note 10, at 520-22.
156 This is the experience, for example, of the Maintenance Cooperative Trust
Fund, a Taft-Hartley trust fund created by unionized janitorial firms as a
watchdog group to enforce labor standards in the industry to deter non-union
firms from undercutting them by violating labor standards. Fine & Gordon,
supra note 4, at 565-66 & n.97.
157 See generally ESTLUND, supra note 7, at 65.
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the private litigation between CPA and Yank Sing Restaurant, and
Seattle's creation of the Labor Standards Advisory Commission,
for example, created incentives for employer-led PIOs to negotiate
with worker-led PIOs for firm-level and sectoral standards.' 5

CPAs

joint negotiations with Yank Sing and public agencies enabled Yank
Sing employees to participate in public agency enforcement and to
monitor compliance with the settlement agreement. Public agency
protection of these groups from retaliation can be a critical, oftenmissing element of worker engagement with public enforcement.
Public agency protection of complainants from retaliation in the
fast food and car wash remedial enforcement campaigns permitted
these workers to speak openly about the problems of precarious
employment to public agencies and to the media after the resolution
of their cases.
To be sure, the examples of collaborative enforcement offered
in this Part could be improved.15 9 The New York State wage board
only proposed lifting the state minimum wage, leaving unaddressed
the question of how to enforce this new, higher standard. The
San Francisco approach of tying collaboration to funding streams
could, over time, erode public agency and PIO independence,
creating disincentives to hold the other publicly accountable. The
New York City carwash bonding opt-out provision for unionized
establishments, at least for now, has been enjoined as preempted
under the NLRA. These limitations and risks suggest the need for
additional constraints on the private delegation and legislative aims
of collaborative enforcement that will be elaborated in the next Part.
C. Proposal: Collaborative Enforcement to Amplify the
Deterrent Effect of Enforcement
The previous sections have shown how collaborative
158 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 55. The New York Car Wash
Association, for example, provides members with trainings on OSHA
compliance and "a legal code and compliance program" for an attorney
to review and correct members' payroll practices. Steve Rotlevi, Mission
Statement, ASSOCIATION OF CAR WASH OWNERS, https://nyccarwashassoc.

herokuapp.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
159 The state legislative backlash since 2015, in which employer-backed political
campaigns have successfully lobbied many states to preempt local mandatory
paid sick leave and minimum wage laws, offers another important limitation
to local labor lawmaking. See generally Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of
State Preemption Laws in Response to Local Policy Innovation, 47 PUBLIUS: J.
FEDERALISM 403 (2017).
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enforcement can amplify the deterrent effect of PIO and public agency
enforcement by integrating enforcement tools and improving legal
remedies, improve the political accountability of public enforcement
and facilitate tripartite lawmaking and case resolution. By analyzing
these two approaches individually, these sections have also shown
their distinct benefits. Grant-based enforcement is effective in
governing ongoing collaborations, while remedial enforcement is
more appropriate for intensive, short-term collaborations. Grantbased enforcement permits the legislature and public agency to
direct enforcement into areas that the statute is intended to address,
whether in an underregulated sector that public enforcement alone
cannot reach, or to elaborate the requirements of a new labor
standard. Remedial enforcement can stimulate the creation of new
remedies if existing enforcement tools are inadequate.
Remedial and grant-based enforcement also have different
PIO stakeholders. Unions are vital participants in remedial
enforcement, while non-union PIOs are ideally suited for grantbased enforcement. Unions have newly repositioned themselves
as lead PIOs in political campaigns for regional and sectoral
labor standards in addition to seeking unionization in low-wage
firms, top-pyramid tools available to unions but not to non-union
PIOs. In contrast, non-union PIOs are well positioned to provide
sophistication to public enforcement because of their superior
access to information about systemic violations in underregulated
sectors of the economy. They also often lack top-pyramid tools to
address widespread noncompliance without access to public agency
remedies.16 0 Lacking the membership dues structure of unions, and
often reliant on government funding,1 6 ' non-union PIOs are better
equipped to sustain this role with public funding in a grant-based
enforcement model. And, unlike unions, non-union PIOs are not
subject to NLRA regulation, which can constrain unions' ability to
protest employers because of labor standards violations.
Even as remedial and grant-based enforcement stand apart
based on their goals and composition, they are complementary and
mutually reinforcing. As shown in Part II, underenforcement is often
a result of pathologies that extend beyond the public-private divide.
While grant-based enforcement primarily addresses capacity and
160 DE GRAAUW, supra note 13, at 51 (finding that only two of 100 studied
community-based organizations serving immigrants in San Francisco had the
resources to fund political advocacy).
161 Id. at 14; Gates et al., supra note 13.
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expertise gaps, remedial enforcement is often necessary to change
the structure of the law where existing remedies are inadequate. An
integrated remedial and grant-based enforcement approach may be
necessary to bridge all three.
Drawing from these examples, a combined approach appears
as follows:

Reme dies; Sanictiotis
Remedial
enforcement
(union

Political campaign

PIOs)

C-'A1 litiation

investiatiot

Grant-based
enforcement
(non-umon

PIs)

udication

Informal resolution

Private enforcement

Public enforcement

In a combined approach, public agencies collaborate with
union-led PIOs to combine public and private enforcement tools to
change the structure of the law where remedies and sanctions are
inadequate. As those standards must then be enforced, public agencies
can then rely on non-union PIOs in a grant-based enforcement
technique. In both phases, enforcement is centered on sectors and
regions characterized by underenforcement of labor standards. In it,
the first goal would be to strengthen labor standards in those sectors
and regions through civil enforcement and legislation. Once this goal
is met, the enforcement priority would shift to channeling ongoing

120

Andrew Elmore

enforcement resources to those sectors and regions to establish a
norm of compliance. In this model, lawmaking achieved through
remedial enforcement would task the public agency enforcing the
new labor standard with delegating education, triage and referral to
non-union PIOs.
Unlike other proposals for public-private collaboration in
labor standards enforcement, which seek to encourage self-regulation
backed by PIO oversight with the threat of state enforcement for
high-risk employers,16 2 collaborative enforcement is an available
strategy in sectors in which enforced self-regulation is not a realistic
near-term strategy. The history of tripartism in these sectors is
that public enforcement often lacks the enforcement tools to
counteract entrenched norms of noncompliance. Instead, the goal of
collaborative enforcement is to amplify the deterrent effect of public
and private enforcement. Deploying PIO and public agency resources
to develop, and coordinate the use of, remedies and sanctions in an
integrated enforcement pyramid is more likely to impact employer
behavior than public agency enforcement alone. These collaborative
enforcement techniques, therefore, flip the tripartism focus to highrisk employers with the ultimate goal of deterring legal violations
sufficiently to make enforced self-regulation possible.
In this framework, grant-based enforcement would restrict
funding eligibility to non-union PIOs. Separating a non-union
PIO's grant-based enforcement activities from direct participation
in unionization campaigns in this manner would protect the legal
regime from political attack as a subterfuge for governmentfunded unionization and non-union PIOs from attack as a "labor
organization" subject to regulation by the NLRA.16 3 In all examples,
162 For example, the "decentered proposal" offered by David Doorey proposes
a two-track enforcement approach, a low-risk stream for employers willing
to negotiate a code of conduct with worker representatives (not unlike the
greengrocer code of conduct), and a high-risk stream for other employers,
subject to heightened state enforcement. David J. Doorey, A Model ofResponsive
Workplace Law, 50 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 47, 77 (2012). This is similar to
Gunningham's and Grabosky's proposed "two-track" regulatory system to
regulate pollution by offering regulatory flexibility for companies that meet a
high environmental standard and traditional regulation for firms that do not.
See GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 5, at 241-46.
163 29 U.S.C. 5 152(5) (2012). The NLRB's Division of Advice has found that
a PIO worker center that routinely negotiates with employers on behalf of
employees to resolve wage-and-hour law violations is not a labor organization
because the settlement agreements reached with employers "were discrete,
non-recurring transactions with each [e]mployer." Michael C. Duff, Alt-Labor,
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remedial enforcement would primarily address gaps in sanctions
regimes by creating new sanctions and prophylactic remedies, such
as bond requirements for restitution for victims of noncompliance
and license revocation authority.
There are limitations to this proposal. Grant-based
enforcement requires a public funding stream (or a PIO able to
sustain collaboration without funding). Remedial enforcement
requires PIOs capable of lobbying state or local governments. In
jurisdictions lacking these elements, the traditional PIO roles of
private enforcers and holding public agencies accountable for public
enforcement will remain necessary.
The next Part addresses the critique that delegating public
enforcement to PIOs undermines the independence of public
agencies and PIOs and evaluates the vulnerability of collaborative
enforcement to challenges under the NLRA and nondelegation
doctrine. It responds that the threat to public agency and PIO
independence can be mitigated by political and administrative
controls. NLRA preemption and the nondelegation doctrine do not
threaten the core requirements of collaborative enforcement, but do
suggest outer boundaries for the scope of private delegation and its
legislative aims.
IV. The Risk of Eroding Public and Private Independence and
Doctrinal Limitations to Collaborative Enforcement
Proponents of formal collaboration between public agencies
and PIOs have not yet addressed important critiques that public
delegation to private entities may undermine public agency
independence from PIOs or PIO independence as monitors of public
agency enforcement. This Part will address these concerns as well
as doctrinal limitations, namely the threats of preemption under
the NLRA to the lawmaking aims of remedial enforcementand of
Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a Labor OrganizationBargain, 63 CATH. U. L. REV.

837, 855-56 & n.121-24 (2014) (quoting NLRB, Office of the Gen. Counsel,
Advice Memorandum, Cases 2-CP-1067, et al. (Nov. 30, 2006)). But as an
agency determination subject to change, the line separating a worker center's
efforts to improve the working conditions of low-wage workers and those of a
labor organization subject to NLRA regulation remains unclear and unstable.
See Ben Penn and Tyrone Richardson, Labor Department Looking Into Worker
Center Scrutiny: Acosta, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.bna.com/
labor-department-looking-n73014472124/ (reporting that Labor Secretary
Acosta is currently reviewing the legal status of worker centers under the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act).
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state nondelegation doctrine to tripartite rulemaking. This Part
will conclude that while these normative concerns and doctrinal
limitations do not threaten the core requirements of collaborative
enforcement, they do suggest the need for controls to ensure that
coordination does not erode public or private enforcer independence,
and for limiting the scope of its private delegation and legislative
aims to avoid litigation challenges.
A. The Erosion of Independent Enforcement
Legal scholars, noting the unprecedented scale and scope of
privatization, have raised important objections to the contracting out
of public services to private entities. 6 4 This scholarship often focuses
on the ways that privatization can erode accountability through the
delegation ofpublic services to contractors with inadequate oversight,
and by placing private contractors beyond the reach of public agency
statutory, administrative and political checks.16 5 Contracting out,
with its sole focus on efficiency, may obscure democratic or other
important values expressed in a public function.' 66 Jon Michaels
raises the separate danger that public agencies may contract out
to private entities as a workaround to bypass political, statutory or
administrative controls in order to aggrandize agency power. 167
Not all of these concerns are present in collaborative
enforcement. Collaborative enforcement's limited delegation permits
public agencies to retain their discretion to make value-laden,
contestable decisions about priorities and case decisions, and limits
the private enforcer role to the vindication of private interests.' 68
164

FREEMAN & MINOW,

supra note 8, at 3-6.

165

&

See, e.g., Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: Privatizing Military Efforts and the
Risks to Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, in id., 110-147. Margaret
Lemos, for instance, argues that the lack of accountability in the deputization
of private attorneys to enforce on behalf of the state can lead to private
attorney fraud and abuse. See Lemos, supra note 9, at 529, 578-82.
166 Sharon Dolovich, How PrivatizationThinks: The Case of Prisons, in FREEMAN
MINOW, supra note 8, at 134.
167 Jon D. Michaels, Privatization'sPretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 719 (2010)
(In an administrative workaround, public agencies may turn to privatization to
achieve "distinct public policy goals that - but for the pretext of technocratic
outsourcing - would be impossible or much more difficult to attain in the
ordinary course of nonprivatized public administration."). See also Jon D.
Michaels, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION'S

THREAT TO THE

AMERICAN REPUBLIC 81 (2017) (hereinafter "CONSTITUTIONAL COUP").

168

The delegation in grant-based enforcement is more modest than in
deputization programs, in which local agencies deputize union representatives
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Its deeply intertwined nature subjects PIOs to meaningful public
agency oversight.16 9 Restricting grant-based enforcement to notfor-profit organizations that would suffer a reputational harm from
fraud or abuse is another control against abuse.1 70 Private delegations
to PIOs do not necessarily undermine democratic values; on the
contrary, collaborative enforcement can serve the democratic value
of channeling worker voice into workplace regulation.
There is, however, the risk that even modest forms of
delegation can undermine the independence of public agencies and
PIOs. The funding of PIO enforcement may create incentives for PIOs
to misuse collaboration by exploiting principal-agent asymmetries
and by seeking to substitute instead of complement public agency
enforcement. Grant-based enforcement may also create incentives
for public agencies to use grants as a form of political patronage,
eroding PIO independence.
This section will first address the concern that grant-based
enforcement will create incentives for PIOs to abuse information
asymmetries and for PIO enforcement to substitute for rather
than complement public agency enforcement, and then turn to the
to conduct inspections in public work construction sites and to assist the
procurement agency with audits, hearings and review conferences for the
enforcement of prevailing wage laws. Fine & Gordon, supra note 4, at 563-65.
While deputization provides the technocratic benefit of "formal power" to
deputies that PIOs often lack in worksite regulation, id. at 565, it also creates
incentives for PIOs to abuse the delegation by exercising public enforcement
"with less notice, resistance, or legal consequence than if they were actually
to join the governmental ranks or otherwise shed their private personas." Jon
D. Michaels, Deputizing HomelandSecurity, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1435, 1452 (2010).
169 Lemos, supra note 9, at 530 (arguing that abuse of enforcement delegations
can be controlled where public enforcers "remain[] in the background, capable
of filling in where private efforts fall short"). Engstrom's empirical analysis of
private litigants who enforce public law as whistleblowers, for instance, found
no support for the claim that privatizing public enforcement claims leads to
abuse. Engstrom, supra note 79, at 1963 ("In sum, the composite evidence
points decisively away from widespread claims that qui tam enforcement
efforts are in the midst of an inefficient 'explosion."').
170 The identity of PIO enforcers is often shaped around assisting the
communities most deeply impacted by enforcement gaps, which would be
placed at risk by fraud or abuse of collaborative enforcement. Also, unlike forprofit entities, which have an incentive to exploit information asymmetries
by charging unreasonably high rates or providing poor services, not-for-profit
corporations have no "owner," but are instead controlled by managers, paid
in salary drawn from funders, who would not directly profit from abuse. See
HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE, 227-30, 233-37
(1996).
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risk that public agencies will misuse grants to silence PIOs that
are potential watchdogs of public enforcement. The section will
conclude that political and administrative controls will be necessary
to preserve PIO and public agency independence.
1. Public Enforcement Independence
There are two primary ways that collaborative enforcement
may erode public agency independence. The first is that PIOs
in grant-based enforcement may misuse private delegations by
exploiting information asymmetries. The second is that PIOs may
seek funding for private enforcement that will replace public agency
functions instead of contributing to them.
First, PIOs may seek to exploit public agency enforcement
resources in unproductive ways.' 7' In grant-based enforcement,
PIOs could triage and refer cases outside the agency's priorities
but which may serve PIO recruitment or other goals.1 72 Delegation
may also invite abuse for difficult-to-monitor functions.' 7 It may
be difficult, for example, for public agencies to monitor grants to
PIOs to educate immigrant communities about labor standards in
languages that public agency personnel cannot speak. While public
agencies could control for these abuses by selecting only PIOs that
would incur reputational harm for misuse of public funds, there may
be few PIOs in a jurisdiction to choose from, and the public agency
enforcer may be ill-equipped to identify which PIOs bear the most
reputational risk, and may instead prefer PIOs without a strong
reputation because of their docility.
In short, the intertwined relationship between PIOs and
public agencies in grant-based enforcement suggests the need for
political and administrative controls in the grant design to prevent
171 See Engstrom, supra note 79, at 2000-01 (In some instances, private attorneys
have used the False Claims Act to exploit regulatory ambiguities rather than
to reveal enforcement gaps.). See generally FREEMAN & MINOW, supra note 8,
at 2-6 (2009); Michaels, supra note 167, at 718.
172 Matthew Stephenson and Howell Jackson have noted similar principal-agent
problems in lobbyist contributions to public policy. See Matthew C. Stephenson
and Howell E. Jackson, Lobbyists as Imperfect Agents: Implicationsfor Public Policy
in aPluralistSystem, 47 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1 (2010).
173 Government contracting of services, such as education and health care, is
often difficult for public agencies to monitor and evaluate because it involves
complex tasks and the direct beneficiaries have no direct relationship with the
public agency funding the services. HANSMANN, supra note 170, at 227-30,
233-37.
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abuse in the PIO selection, training, monitoring and evaluation
process.174 Grant-based enforcement often comes at the direction of
the local legislature,175 creating the possibility of a formal legislative
review process,1 76 and legislative delegation of grant selection and
monitoring to third-party government agencies and PIOs177 to check

against abuse.
Transparency is an important, additional control against
abuse of grant-based enforcement. A legislative requirement that
public agencies disclose their grant-based enforcement priorities
and benchmarks prior to PIO selection will improve the screening
of PIOs during the selection process by limiting consideration of
PIOs to those that can meet pre-set selection criteria. It would
also empower watchdogs and the regulated entities to identify and
mobilize against perceived abuse in grant-based enforcement.' 7
174 See Laura A. Dickinson, Public Values/Private Contract, in GOVERNMENT
BY CONTRACT 336 (arguing that "the very government contracting that
is the engine of privatization itself opens the space for an intriguing set of
accountability mechanisms").
175 See, e.g., Berkeley, Berkeley, Cal., Mun. Code Ch. 13.99, 5 13.99.080 (2016)
("The Department of Finance shall seek out partnerships with communitybased organizations and collaborate with the Labor Commission to facilitate
effective implementation and enforcement."); Los Angeles Cnty., Cal., Ord.
No. 102703 amending County Code, Title 8 - Consumer Protection, Business
and Wage Regulations relating to the enforcement of the County Minimum
Wage Ordinance, 5 8.101.090(G) (Apr. 26, 2016). ("The DCBA shall have
the authority to contract, in accordance with County contracting rules and
procedures, with Community Based Organizations for them to assist in
the education and outreach related to the Los Angeles County Minimum
Wage Ordinance and this Chapter."); San Francisco, S.F., Cal., Ord. No.
140687, Amending S.F. Mun. Code 5 12R.25 (July 17, 2014) ("The Office
of Labor Standards Enforcement shall establish a community-based outreach
program to conduct education and outreach to employees. In partnership
with organizations involved in the community-based outreach program, the
Office of Labor Standards shall create outreach materials that are designed for
workers in particular industries.").
176 Michaels, supra note 167, at 769-70. If the legislature identifies abuses in
the grant-based enforcement it requires, "legislators can apply resistance in
proportion to the perceived encroachment on their prerogatives." Id. at 770.
177 As Ayres and Braithwaite argue, delegating monitoring to third-party PIOs
can prevent abuse by making grant-seeking PIOs accountable to third parties
that may replace the PIO in the grant-based relationship should the initial
delegation fail. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 57 (arguing that
contestable guardianship requires "a regulatory culture where information on
regulatory deals is freely available to all individual members of a multitude
of" PIOs).
178 Transparency may also improve training of public agency and PIO staff, by
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Transparency may improve legislative review and ongoing screening
and monitoring functions by permitting third-party monitoring, to
evaluate PIO use of public funding against public agency priorities
to detect funding misuse.
The second concern is that public funding of PIOs for
services that could be provided by public agencies themselves
can erode the public's view of the role of government in society.
At least in some instances, this critique does not apply because
collaboration entails the integration of private enforcement tools
that are otherwise inaccessible to the public agency. In the case of
remedial enforcement, the complementary nature of a PIO's toptier enforcement tools-PIO public protests, unionization and
political campaigns-is clear. But PIO collaboration is not necessarily
complementary. In other instances, it is at least plausible that
public enforcement regimes could be retooled to address (or avoid)
a capacity or expertise deficit. A public agency, for example, could
encourage complaints through an agency-run mediation program
instead of by providing grants to PIOs to privately resolve them.
In this instance, it may be that a PIO-delegated informal resolution
is preferable to public agency mediation. A PIO may have a unique
relationship with a particular worker community, its staff may have
cultural and linguistic competencies that public agency staff lack, or
a PIO may be better positioned to allay worker fears about retaliation
than staff in public agencies, at least at the outset.'7 9 Or, it could be
that the public agency would be better served by building internal
expertise in cultural and linguistic competencies, and that an internal
mediation program would permit public agencies to select targets
for public enforcement while promoting civic engagement in public
enforcement without PIO assistance.
The question of whether grant-based enforcement is
complementary or substitutive, therefore, is necessarily contingent
on the enforcement tool, the worker community and the PIO. This
suggests an additional need for transparency about the complementary
service the public agency seeks through collaboration. Requiring a
public agency justification for delegation of responsibilities could
restrict grants to services that the public agency could not provide
guiding personnel across the public-private divide about shared priorities.
Seattle and San Francisco, for example, require PIO staff to undergo training
with public agency staff about the information that the PIs is charged with
providing to the public. Dickenson, supra note 177, at 430-41.
179 DE GRAAUW, supra note 13, at 9.
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itself and that would generate additional benefits if provided by
the PIO, such as civic integration of groups that do not normally
participate in the political process. The legislature could require
public agencies seeking collaboration with PIOs to condition funds on
the transfer of expertise to public agency staff, ultimately improving
the provision of public services to underrepresented groups.
2. Harm to Private Enforcement
There is also the possibility, underdiscussed in the literature,
that public delegations could also harm private enforcement by
undermining PIO independence as monitors of public agency
enforcement.1s0 Even without imposing legal restrictions,"' a
public agency could seek to use the benefits of collaboration to
PIOs in order to co-opt them. In essence, public agencies may use
grant-based enforcement as a workaround, but instead of evading
statutory or administrative controls, 8 2 the public agency may use
grants to evade public accountability by chilling the speech of
PIOs that have traditionally served as watchdogs for public agency
enforcement. Public agencies could restrict funded collaboration to
those PIOs that agree to advocate that the legislature expand the
public agency's budgets or authority, or those PIOs that refrain
from criticizing the public agency.'1 3 Or the public agency could
180 Whether government funding decreases the political activity of not-forprofit organizations has been the subject of sociological research, with the
ambiguous conclusion that government funding creates incentives in both
directions and has no clear net effect. See Chaves et al., Does Government Funding
Suppress Nonprofits'PoliticalActivity?, 69 AM. Soc. REV. 292, 313-15 (2004).
181 Some grant-based enforcement may impose broad lobbying restrictions on
participating PIs that suppress their role as monitor of public enforcement.
New York City, for example, prohibits the use of discretionary funds for
any form of "lobbying." See NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL, DISCRETIONARY
FUNDING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 7, http://council.nyc.gov/budget/
wpcontent/uploads/sites/54/2017/01/PoliciesProceduresJan2017.pdf
("Funds may only be allocated for a public purpose and may not support
political activities (including but not limited to lobbying, campaigns or
endorsements) and/or private interests.").
182 Michaels points to ways that outsourcing may aggrandize agency executives
by permitting them to, for example, bypass statutory privacy protections
by contracting data mining operations to private contractors, and sideline
politically insulated civil servants who may oppose the executive's priorities
by outsourcing research and regulatory drafting responsibilities to private
experts. Michaels, supra note 167, at 721-22.
183 See, e.g., DE GRAAUW, supra note 13, at 14 (finding from interviews with PIs
in San Francisco, that "[w]hen immigrant-serving nonprofits advocated too
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seek collaboration to shift responsibility of the priority away from
itself, potentially also shifting blame to the PIO if an enforcement
effort fails. Some of these risks are mitigated by the nature of PIOs
as non-profit organizations that serve communities that can hold
PIOs accountable for cooptation by the public agency. PIOs may be
less susceptible to adverse treatment by public agencies if they are
equally or more deterred by the possibility of backlash from their
membership or base. But, and particularly for PIOs insulated from
backlash from the communities that they serve, cooptation is a
genuine threat to their independence.
Political and administrative controls will be equally important
to protect PIOs from public agency cooptation and unfair blame. As
with protecting the independence of public agencies, transparency
about the public agency's policy choices in the grant-making process
would also enable the legislature to control against abuse. The risk
of cooptation can also be reduced by assigning the grant-monitoring
role to a third-party PIO and public agency. There is an additional
need for explicit whistleblower protections in grant contracts
sufficient to encourage PIOs to complain about public agency abuse.
In conclusion, while abuse is possible in any principalagent relationship, grant-based enforcement is less susceptible to
abuse because of its limited delegation, intertwined nature, and
political accountability. Political control over the grant selection and
evaluation in grant-based enforcement, transparency about the public
agency's enforcement priorities, and administrative controls, such
as third-party selection and monitoring of PIOs and whistleblower
protections, can further limit the potential of abuse.
Of course, these political and administrative controls may
supply an appearance of public agency and PIO independence without
providing substantive protections.114 The legislature may lack the
interest or sophistication to identify fraud or abuse, and third-party
PIOs and government agencies may find that objective evaluation
of PIOs that seek grants is elusive. Abuses hidden in public agency
disclosures may be difficult to unmask. To the extent that the
aggressively, they worried that city officials might react by endangering their
tax status or government funding").
184 See Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1095, 1096 (2009) (quoting DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION
OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 3 (2006)) (cautioning that
many formal controls on administrative agencies can operate as mere faqades
that agencies can easily bypass).
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funding of PIOs in grant-based enforcement may not overcome the
risks of abuse, state and local governments could coordinate with
PIOs without funding, and seek other ways to fund PIO enforcement
outside of the collaborative relationship.1 5
B. NLRA Preemption and State Nondelegation
There are only two legal doctrines that might prevent
state or local agencies from collaborating with PIOs in enforcing
labor standards. The most important of these is the NLRA, which
preempts state and local laws that condition a public benefit on
acceptance of union neutrality. The second, state nondelegation
doctrine, constrains legislative grants to public agencies and private
entities.' 86
Other legal doctrines, such as other constitutional separation
of powers principles and freedom of information laws, do not
significantly restrict collaborative enforcement. The exercise of
enforcement discretion is presumptively valid, and the selection and
resolution of cases based in part on a PIO's private enforcement does
not nullify a law or violate an express statutory command.'1 7 Any
delegation entailed in grant-based enforcement is either expressly or
impliedly authorized by statute, presenting no separation of powers
problem either."' Nor do state and local freedom of information
laws significantly constrain collaborative enforcement. A public
agency generally need not disclose information about a pending
185 New York City has recently experimented, for example, with allowing fast
food employees to self-fund PIO enforcement through voluntary deductions
from paychecks, see N.Y.C. COUNCIL Intro. Bill No. 1384 (2016), and where
unions have successfully unionized firms in remedial enforcement initiatives,
they may seek to create employer-employee funded Taft Hartley funds to
enforce labor standards among their competitors. See Elmore & Chishti, supra
note 28, at 14 (describing formation of Taft Hartley fund in Illinois to police
prevailing wage bids in the construction industry); ESTLUND, supra note 7,
at 117-22 (describing formation of Maintenance Cooperative Trust Fund in
California following the "Justice for Janitors" union campaign, "to identify
and challenge labor standards violations among janitorial contractors").
186 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) ("In a delegation
challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated
legislative power to the agency.").
187 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-35, 837-38 (1985) (holding that a
public agency's nonenforcement decision is presumptively nonreviewable).
188 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 (1952)
Jackson, J., concurring) ("When the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum.").
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investigation or litigation,119 and open meetings laws would merely
require the types of transparency in grant-based enforcement that
San Francisco and Seattle already provide.

'

1. NLRA Preemption
While the NLRA contains no express preemption provision,
the Supreme Court has found two "unquestionably and remarkably
90 variations of implied preemption under the NLRA.' 9
broad"o
Under the first, Garmon preemption, the NLRA preempts states
and localities from regulating conduct that is "arguably" prohibited
or protected by the NLRA.1 92 The second, Machinists preemption,
prohibits any state and local regulation of union conduct that
Congress intended to leave unregulated. 193
Most lawmaking sought by remedial enforcement identified
in this Article does not implicate Garmon or Machinists preemption
because they are laws of general applicability, which affects all
employees equally, and "neither encourages nor discourages the
collective-bargaining process. "194 State and local lawmaking to
establish wage-and-hour law standards above the federal minimum
is expressly permitted by FLSA195 and grant-based enforcement
channels enforcement to all employers in the informal economy.
Tripartite lawmaking of the type that resulted in the New York wage
board proposal to increase fast food worker wages in the state is
also a law of general applicability and does not constitute the kind
of collective bargaining regulated by the NLRA.1 96 Increasing local
189 See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Off. Law 5 87(2) (2015) (discussing interference with a law
enforcement investigation exception).
190 Benjamin I. Sachs, DespitePreemption:Making Labor Law in Cities and States, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1164 (2011).
191 Id. at 1164-69.
192 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 259-60 (1959).
193 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp't Rel. Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976);
see also Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton 377 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1964) (State
law that prohibits secondary boycotts permitted by the NLRA preempted;
boycotts are a self-help weapon permitted under federal law that states cannot
regulate.). Labor scholars criticize the breadth of these preemption doctrines
for stifling state and local experimentation with labor law. See Estlund, supra
note 56, at 1572; see also Sachs, supra note 190, at 1168-69 (describing the
history and evolution of NLRA preemption doctrine).
194 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 755 (1985).
195 29 U.S.C. 5 218(a) (2012).
196 See Andrias, supra note 6, at 91-92 (arguing that finding this type of tripartite
lawmaking to be preempted "would require a significant expansion of
preemption law").
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minimum wages and establishing uniformly-applied remedies to
operationalize these rights, such as licenses and labor bonds to
operate a car wash, face no plausible NLRA preemption challenge. 197
Lawmaking that permits union workplaces to "opt-out" of
remedies that apply to non-union workplaces, however, faces the
plausible argument that Machinists preemption applies to the extent
that they coerce employers to adopt a position of union neutrality.
In New York City, following the passage of a local law requiring a
labor bond and registration for car wash establishments, subject to
an opt-out for unionized car washes, the local car wash association
sued, claiming that the NLRA preempts the law. 98 The trial judge
in that case, Association of Car Wash Owners v. City of New York,' 99
agreed, finding that the opt-out "explicitly encourages unionization,
and therefore impermissibly intrudes on the labor-management
bargaining process" and is preempted by the NLRA. 20 0 The case is
now on appeal. 2 0 1

While the ultimate outcome of Association of Car Wash Owners
remains uncertain, the trial court's decision shows that NLRA
preemption is a plausible threat to opt-outs, particularly if the opt-out
imposes onerous requirements on non-union firms or if legislators
seek an opt-out to advance union campaigns. The two Supreme Court
cases that set the limits on state and local regulations that impact
labor relations are Golden State Transit Corporation v. Los AngeleS 202
and Chamber of Commerce v. Brown. 203 In Golden State Transit Corp., the
Supreme Court held that the state's conditioning of the renewal
of a taxicab franchise on the settlement of a strike was preempted
because it "destroyed the balance of power designed by Congress,
and frustrated Congress' decision to leave open the use of economic
weapons." 2 0 4 In Brown, the Supreme Court held that California could
197 See Am. Hotel and Lodging Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 834 F.3d 958, 965-66
(9th Cir. 2016). ("We have consistently held that minimum labor standards
do not implicate Machinists preemption.").
198 Ass'n of Car Wash Owners Inc. v. City of N.Y., 15-CV-08157 (AKH), Pl's
Mem. Supp. S.J. Mot. (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2015).
199 Ass'n of Car Wash Owners Inc. v. City of N.Y., 15-CV-08157 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
16, 2015).
200 Ass'n of Car Wash Owners Inc. v. City of N.Y., 15-CV-08157 (AKH), Order
Granting Pl's S.J. Mot. (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2017).
201 Ass'n of Car Wash Owners Inc. v. City of N.Y., 15-CV-08157 (AKH), Notice of
Appeal, (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2017).
202 475 U.S. 608 (1986).
203 554 U.S. 60 (2008).
204 Golden State Transit Corp., 475 U.S. at 619.
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not condition public contracts on an employer's position of union
neutrality.205 It found that Congress had "renounced" the state's
policy judgment that partisan employer speech interferes with an
employee's choice about whether to be represented by a labor union
in the Taft-Hartley Act, and thus conflicted with federal policy. 206 In
both cases, lawmaking that seeks to coerce an employer to accept
union neutrality, even indirectly through government licensing or
procurement powers, is preempted under Machinists.20 7
A broad interpretation of Association of Car Wash Owners
that would displace state laws that contain opt-outs for employers
subject to a collective bargaining agreement because they "explicitly
encourage[]" and "pressur[e] businesses to unionize" 208 would
require an extension to existing Machinists doctrine. To be sure,
the NLRA displaces state laws that substantially interfere with a
non-union firm's ability to operate unless it agrees to a collective
bargaining agreement. 2 09 But Golden Gate and Brown do not suggest
that state and local labor standards that provide narrow opt-outs for
employers subject to collective bargaining agreements are subject
to NLRA preemption under Machinists, and courts have repeatedly
205 Brown, 554 U.S. at 69.
206 Id.
207 Project labor agreements are typically not preempted under the market
participant doctrine because they advance only the proprietary, and not
regulatory, interest of the state. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Assoc.
Builders & Contractors of Massachussetts/Rhode Island, 507 U.S. 218, 223,

231-32 (1993); Michigan Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. Snyder, 729 F.3d
572, 581-82 (6th Cir. 2013). But state and local governments cannot bypass
NLRA preemption review by formally grounding its power to condition
union neutrality in its procurement or tax authority. See Brown, 554 U.S. at
70 (rejecting the argument that using a procurement power to require union
neutrality fell within the market participant exception to NLRA preemption);
Assoc. Builders and Contractors Inc. v. City of Jersey City, 836 E3d 412, 41721 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that a city that conditions tax exemptions on
union neutrality acts as a regulator rather than a market participant).

208 Ass'n of Car Wash Owners Inc. v. City of N.Y., 15-CV-08157 (AKH), Order

209

Granting Pl's S.J. Mot. at 6 (finding that "a fivefold increase in the amount
of a surety bond required for car washing companies that are not parties to a
collective bargaining agreement, or, alternatively, an independent monitoring
scheme and large security deposits," amounts to a penalty on non-union car
washes).
See Golden State Transit Corp., 475 U.S. at 619; Chamber of Commerce v.

Bragdon, 64 F.3d 497, 501 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring prevailing wage terms
in private contract Machinists preempted because terms so onerous it dictated
collective bargaining process).
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upheld them against NLRA preemption challenges. 2 1 0 States
have "broad authority under their police powers to regulate the
employment relationship," 2 1 1 even if they alter the economic balance
between labor and management. 212 The NLRA "cast[s] no shadow
on the validity" 2 13 of an opt-out provision, even if it "provided
an incentive to unionize or to remain non-union" and may have a
"potential benefit or burden in application." 2 14 The Ninth Circuit in
American Hotel and LodgingAssociation,2 15 for example, recently upheld
a city ordinance's waiver for collective bargaining in a minimum
wage ordinance against a Machinists preemption challenge. The
modest opt-out provision in American Hotel did not approach the
overreaching enforcement action of Golden State, in which the state
agency sought to use state regulation to intervene in a labor strike,
or the state command of union neutrality in Brown, which went well
beyond protecting state funds. 2 16 For the Ninth Circuit, unlike state
action that "intrudes on the mechanics of collective bargaining," like
those found preempted in Golden State and Brown, opt-outs merely
establish a labor standard that sets the stage for future bargaining,
which is not preempted. 2 17 Thus, while a wage bond opt-out almost
certainly creates a cost for non-union employers, the court appears to
have ignored the second step of the analysis, to determine whether
the cost sufficiently interferes with collective bargaining. 218 This is
210 See Am. Hotel and Lodging Ass'n, 834 at 965 (holding that union opt out
provision in minimum wage standard not preempted by NLRA); Viceroy
Gold Corp. v. Aubry, 75 F.3d 482, 489-90 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that union
carve out in state maximum hours legislation not preempted by NLRA); Filo
Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac, 183 Wash. 2d 770, 778, 796-97 (Wash. 2015)
(upholding union waiver provision in SeaTac's recent $15 per hour minimum
wage increase against Machinists preemption challenge).
211 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976).
212 Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21 (1987); Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
471 U.S. at 754; see also Concerned Home Care Providers, Inc. v. Cuomo, 783
F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2015).
213 Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994).
214 Viceroy Gold, 75 F.3d at 490. See also Livadas, 512 U.S. at 132 n.26 (reasoning
that it does not "seem plausible to suggest that Congress meant to pre-empt
such opt-out laws, as 'burdening' the statutory right of employees not to join
unions by denying nonrepresented employees the 'benefit' of being able to
'contract out' of such standards").
215 834 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2016).
216 Id. at 964-66.
217 Id. at 964.
218 Castillo v. Toll Bros, 197 Cal. App. 4th 1172, 1207 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(finding that to the extent that an opt-out imposed costs on firms that can
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particularly the case, as the Supreme Court reasoned in FortHalifax,2 19
since opt-outs only apply to firms that have already bargained for a
similar requirement. 2 20
However, while a broad interpretation of Association of Car
Wash Owners that would invalidate all opt-outs cannot be reconciled
with established law, a narrower, more defensible interpretation is
possible, that animating the court's decision is skepticism of the
local law's purpose. The court, citing comments made by New York
City councilmembers during the legislative hearing supportive of the
PIOs' unionization campaign, 22 1 concluded that "a central purpose
of [the wage bond bill] is to encourage unionization in the car wash
industry." 2 22 This suggests the need for clarity in opt-out provisions

219

220

221
222

be reduced in collective bargaining, that impact on collective bargaining is
"insufficiently substantial to trigger Machinists preemption"). Cf Rondout
Elec., Inc. v. NYS Dept. of Labor, 335 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 2003) ("While
the [state] regulation may impose an additional cost on non-union employers
... this increase does not affect the bargaining process that is the subject of
the NLRA.").
Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. at 21-22 ("If a statute that permits no
collective bargaining on a subject escapes NLRA pre-emption ... surely one
that permits such bargaining cannot be pre-empted."); see also Livadas, 512
U.S. 107 (1994) (distinguishing California policy not to enforce state law
requiring immediate payment of wages due upon discharge for employees
subject to collective bargaining agreements on this ground).
California's wage bond opt-outs only apply to collective bargaining agreements
that obligate employers to pay particular wages and 'An expeditious process
to resolve disputes concerning nonpayment of wages." CAL. LAB. CODE 5
2055(b) (4) (D) (West 2015). See St. Thomas-St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass'n
v. Government of U.S. Virgin Islands, 218 F.3d 232, 245 (3d Cir. 2000)
(upholding opt-out to minimum wage protection because it "does not force
an employee to choose between collective bargaining and the protections of
state law; rather, it protects all . . . employees, but gives employees the option
of relinquishing the territorial statutory protections through the terms of a
collective-bargaining agreement"); Firestone v. Southern California Gas Co,.
219 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding California overtime opt-out
provision because it "does not operate automatically to exempt virtually all
union-represented employees from its coverage-it exempts only those who
have bargained for an alternative overtime compensation scheme").
Ass'n of Car Wash Owners Inc. v. New York, 15-CV-08157 (AKH), Order
Granting Pl's S.J. Mot., at 6 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2017).
Id. While it is unclear from the court's decision whether the councilmembers'
statements were in reference to the opt-out provision, the decision correctly
states that opt-out provisions must be motivated by a purpose other than to
support or encourage unionization. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.
v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 63 (2008) (quoting the statute's express legislative
purpose to "prohibit an employer from using state funds and facilities for
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that their intent is to permit private negotiation for remedies rather
than to encourage unionization. Legislation permitting waiver of
prophylactic remedies such as labor bonds could also clarify the
low need for labor bonds in firms subject to collective bargaining
agreements because they are less likely to violate employment laws
than non-union firms. To mitigate the preemption threat, the cost of
compliance with a statute without a waiver should also be directly
tied to the enforcement problem and should not be so onerous that
union neutrality is the only meaningful choice for employers in the
sector or region.
Alternatively, one might seek to minimize the preemption
threat by modifying a statutory opt-out by expanding the exemption
to not only employers with a collective bargaining agreement, but
also those non-union employers who can adequately demonstrate
compliance with labor standards. However, such an approach would
multiply the administrative complexity of the law. It may also
provide incentives for employers to use the exemption to skirt the
requirements of the law. Given these countervailing risks, and that
these waivers are not essential to collaborative enforcement, should
preemption law expand to encompass remedial differences between
unionized and non-union firms, it may be preferable to avoid them
entirely.
2. State Nondelegation Doctrine
Collaborative enforcement must also account for the
nondelegation doctrine, which constrains administrative rulemaking,
not enforcement authority, which is an executive function. 2 2 3 As a
result, nondelegation principally constrains remedial enforcement's
use of tripartite rulemaking. Federal nondelegation doctrine and that
of most states impose few constraints on private delegations. Courts
have not found a violation of the federal nondelegation doctrine
since 1936, and the distinction between public agency and private
the purpose of influencing employees to support or oppose unionization")
(quoting 2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 872 5 1). In Brown, the Supreme Court relied on
the state statute's preamble to conclude that it sharply conflicted with federal
policy under the NLRA to permit noncoercive employer speech opposing
unionization. Id. at 68.
223 Courts routinely uphold delegations of executive power, including the power
to arrest, to private individuals. See David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise
of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 648, 666 (1986) ("The power to arrest
has been delegated to railway police, to humane society agents, and to bail
bondsmen.").
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stakeholder delegations has not figured prominently in federal
nondelegation cases. 22 4 While courts have invoked the nondelegation
doctrine to strike down private delegations at the state and local
levels, 2 25 in most states delegations to private parties are permissible
so long as the agency retains the ultimate authority to approve and
the agency provides sufficient safeguards to prevent abuse. 2 26
For these states, two cases that consider claims that prevailing
wage laws unconstitutionally delegate prevailing wage rate setting
power to local employers and unions illustrate the nondelegation
doctrine constraints on state and local delegations of rulemaking
power to private parties. In Beary Landscaping, Inc. v. Costigan,2 2 7 the
Seventh Circuit considered a challenge by construction contractors
of the Illinois prevailing wage law that set the wage rate based
on collective bargaining agreements (CBA) for construction work
in the county on the ground this constitutes an unconstitutional
224 Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation Skepticism: Due Process,
Nondelegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 931, 95662 (2014). Federal courts have declined to strike down delegations to private
entities since Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). See Gillian E.
Metzger, Privatization and Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1438-40
(2003); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1939) (Delegation by Secretary
ofAgriculture to private auction markets to inspect and sell tobacco products is
constitutional because growers vote on creation of markets by referendum and
Secretary may suspend designated market for lack of competent inspectors or
insufficient quantity of tobacco.); Todd & Co. v. S.E.C., 577 F.2d 1008, 1012-14
(3d Cir. 1977) (describing how delegated self-regulation of securities dealers
by SEC to private, independent association not unconstitutional as permitted
by Maloney Act, which permits the SEC to register private organizations to
discipline brokers in order to prevent fraud and protect investors, with a right
of appeal to the SEC).
225 See generally Davidson, supra note 15, at 622-24. Courts routinely strike down
local zoning ordinances, for example, that delegate lawmaking power to
private residents to limit neighbors' use of their property. See, e.g., Marta v.
Sullivan, 248 A.2d 608, 610 & n.3 (Del. 1968).
226 See Jim Rossi, InstitutionalDesign and the LingeringLegacyofAntifederalistSeparation
of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1191-1201 (1999). The
nondelegation doctrines of California and Washington both track federal
nondelegation doctrine. See Light v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 226 Cal.
App. 4th 1463, 1494 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that private delegation of
development of programs to preserve wild salmon not unlawful delegation so
long as agency exercised independent discretion in their evaluation); Murray v.
State, Dept. of Lab. & Ind. 403 P.3d 949, (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (finding that
legislative delegation of determination regarding whether health technology
is includable as a covered benefit in a health care program to a public authority
composed of private physicians did not violate state nondelegation doctrine).
227 667 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2012).
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delegation of rulemaking power to unions and employers subject
to CBAs. In rejecting this argument, the Seventh Circuit reasoned
that the Illinois statute, which required administrative and judicial
review of a prevailing wage rate before it became final, sufficiently
constrained private rulemaking power to satisfy the nondelegation
doctrine. 2 28 In contrast, the Second Circuit in General Elec. Co. v.
New York State Dep't of Labor22 9 held that an allegation that a union
and employer colluded to raise prevailing wage rates established
through their CBA to off-set lower private-sector wages (thereby
shifting the disproportionately high rate to the taxpayers) without
any administrative oversight sufficient to allege an unconstitutional
delegation. 2 3 0

Beary and General Electric suggest that in these states, the
nondelegation doctrine requires state and local legislatures in
legislating collaborative enforcement to refrain from delegating
rulemaking power to PIOs unless it is guided by administrative
agencies and subject to judicial review. Tripartite rulemaking in
these states can follow the model of the New York wage board,
which included government representatives, required public agency
approval and afforded opponents the opportunity for judicial
review. 231
While Beary and General Electric reflect the majority view of
how states constrain tripartite regulation via the nondelegation
doctrine, a minority of states have a stronger nondelegation
doctrine, 2 32 and it is an open question how these states treat private
delegations. At the outer end of private delegation skepticism is
Texas, which crafted a unique set of criteria to "specifically impose
some limits on delegations to private parties." 23 3 Reasoning that
"private delegations clearly raise even more troubling constitutional
issues than their public counterparts," the Texas Supreme Court

228
229
230
231

Id. at 951.
936 F.2d 1448, 1457-59 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1457-59.
See Nat'l Rest. Ass'n v. Comm'r of Labor, 141 A.D.3d 185, 191-95 (3d Dept
2016). See also Andrias, supra note 6, at 65, 89-90.
232 This is the law in New York. See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hisp. Chambers of
Com. v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d 681, 711 (2014)
(Read, J., dissenting) (characterizing New York's nondelegation doctrine as
"strong" in criticizing the majority decision striking down the Sugary Drinks
Portion Cap Rule as an unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking).
233 Volokh, supra note 224, at 965.

138

Andrew Elmore

in Texas Boll Weevil EradicationFoundation v. Lewellen 2 3 4 held that in

addition to judicial review and safeguards against abuse, that state's
nondelegation doctrine requires that that private delegations be free
from potential conflicts, 2 35 which is difficult to reconcile with the
purpose of tripartite regulation to include all interested stakeholders
in the regulatory process. 2 36
One might discount the Texas nondelegation doctrine
as an outlier, but it does reflect a broader concern of the deeper
involvement of private actors in public regulation at the local level,
raising judicial concerns about local corruption. 23 7 Indeed, this
skepticism is warranted, as is Jon Michaels's call for a stronger
nondelegation doctrine in order to protect "the tripartite architecture
of administrative power" from privatization. 2 38 While this Article
agrees that judicial supervision must account for the incentives
for abuse in private delegations, 239 as Nestor Davidson argues in
proposing a functionalist local nondelegation doctrine, oversight of
collaborative enforcement "should reflect the advantages as well as the
risks that public involvement, knowledge, and accountability bring
to local agencies. "240 Collaborative enforcement seeks to integrate
private participation in tripartite workplace regulation, a potentially
234 952 S.W.2d 454, 468 (Tex. 1997). In Lewellen, the Texas legislature created
a non-profit organization to oversee boll weevil eradication efforts to protect
the state's cotton industry, overseen by the state's agriculture commission. Id.
at 457-62.
235 Id. at 469-72.
236 See Volokh, supra note 224, at 969-70.
237 Davidson, supra note 15, at 623-24.
238 MICHAELS, supra note 167, at 188-90; see also Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive
Surveillance, PoliticalProcess Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J.
1721, 1770-75 (2014) (arguing that "mission creep" and other potential
abuses of large-scale surveillance and enforcement justify administrative law
controls on law enforcement).
239 This Article agrees that the nondelegation doctrine should supervise private
delegations that "disrupt the democratic inclusivity and heterogeneity of civil
society." MICHAELS, supra note 167, at 190. But a test that hinges on the
public/private distinction is difficult to apply to collaborative enforcement,
which is neither fully public nor private, and collaborative enforcement is
entitled to more deference than other private delegations that create a high risk
of abuse. Specifically, a functional nondelegation doctrine would not prohibit
delegations to private stakeholders that have an interest in the delegation,
would instead determine whether the limited delegation and intertwined
nature of the delegation were sufficient safeguards against abuse, and would
only invalidate tripartite rulemaking if it lacked administrative oversight and
an inclusive process to invite participation by private stakeholders.
240 Davidson, supra note 15, at 624.
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democracy-enhancing benefit. Stimulating tripartite regulation of
the low-wage workplace requires administrative interventions that
encourage PIOs to channel worker voice into regulation. In most
states, this benefit and the limited delegation and intertwined
nature of collaborative enforcement should be sufficient for its
private delegations to survive nondelegation review. But a strong
nondelegation doctrine may ignore these benefits and controls,
greeting collaborative enforcement with the same skepticism as
privatization schemes that invite local corruption or administrative
aggrandizement. As with opt-outs under the NLRA, in Texas and
states with a similar nondelegation test for private delegations,
remedial enforcement can avoid nondelegation challenges through
a standard, non-tripartite rulemaking process.
V. Conclusion
This Article offers an important, emerging proposal for how
state and local public agencies and PIOs can collaborate to make
workplace regulation more effective and efficient, create a system
of political accountability for public enforcement, and facilitate
sophisticated forms of tripartism. It proposes positioning PIOs as
private enforcers coordinating resources and creating and deploying
sanctions with state and local public agencies to change the behavior of
regulated entities with high rates of legal noncompliance. This inverts
the standard account of the PIO role in regulation, from enforcing
self-regulation by high-compliance firms to amplifying the deterrent
effect of enforcement among low-compliance firms, and to elaborate
new legal requirements. This refines previous theories of publicprivate regulatory experimentation by showing that collaboration
can not only promote self-regulation where the regulated entities
have the expertise and motivation to comply with the law, but also
to deter violations where enforced self-regulation is unlikely in the
near term. The transparency that collaborative enforcement requires
makes public enforcers more political accountable for the value-laden
choices they make, and can preserve their independent judgment by
limiting the scope of private delegation and preventing capture by
the regulated entities. While the private delegation of collaborative
enforcement can create incentives for abuse, the limited delegation
and intertwined nature of collaborative enforcement make abuse
less likely than more familiar forms of private delegations, such as
deputization, and manageable through political and administrative
controls. This analysis is applicable to other areas, such as consumer
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protection, fair housing and civil rights enforcement, in which PIOs
cannot effectively vindicate private rights alone, and in which public
agencies may benefit from PIO sophistication and access to private
enforcement tools.
A final, underdiscussed theme of collaborative enforcement
is the role of state and local government in mediating and
channeling public participation into enforcement governance, and as
a site for sophisticated tripartite regulation. Coalescing individuals
into stakeholder groups is of particular value in regulating small,
undercapitalized employers, where traditional regulation rarely
reaches, and which otherwise would not participate in tripartite
regulation of the workplace. 24 1 This suggests that the effectiveness
of collaborative enforcement in facilitating tripartism will depend, in
part, on where the collaborating agency is positioned in the federalist
system.

241 See

ESTLUND,

supra note 7, at 141.

